Time for the VA to Clean Up Its Act

One year after a Veterans Affairs (VA) scandal was ignited here in Phoenix, the number of veterans on wait lists is 50 percent higher than at the same time last year, according to VA data (1). The VA is also facing a nearly $3 billion budget shortfall. VA Secretary Bob McDonald has asked for “flexibility” to reallocate billions of dollars in clinical funds to cover the shortfall.

Since the scandal broke last year, VA providers have increased their workloads, adding 2.7 million more appointments than the previous year. However, the VA has played "games" with patient eligibility for years. When money was plentiful VA administrators would open the doors to patients since the following years' budgets were based on the number of patients seen. However, when money was tight, the doors would be slammed shut leaving many patients in the lurch scrambling to obtain health care elsewhere. Now it appears that patients might be returning to the VA.

“Something has to give,” the department’s deputy secretary, Sloan D. Gibson, said in an interview. “We can’t leave this as the status quo. We are not meeting the needs of veterans, and veterans are signaling that to us by coming in for additional care, and we can’t deliver it as timely as we want to.” Now the VA is asking Congress' permission to use clinical funds to pay for the budgetary shortfall.

The VA has threatened furloughs and hiring freezes to reduce spending. This seems to be quite sensible. However, in the past, the VA has cut clinical positions which undoubtedly contributed to longer wait times. For example, when I was chief of pulmonary at the Phoenix VA, one of my physicians retired, giving 6 month notice. However, we were not allowed to replace the physician because of a "hiring freeze". This apparently only applied to clinicians since a new associate director was hired.

As we predicted over a year ago, the VA would continue to be troubled due to lack of reform and oversight (2).  The present VA secretary, Robert McDonald, is still relatively new on the job and inexperienced in both healthcare and government service. His inaction suggests that he may be confused, or worse, listening to long-entrenched central office bureaucrats. Below are some suggestions which could result in substantial savings and would have little impact on patient care.

Furlough the staffs of the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISNs), the 21 VA regional offices which are scheduled to be downsized. The VISNs provide no healthcare and the savings in salaries from the nearly 5000 employees would be substantial (2). Similarly, VA central office which grew from 800 employees to 11,000 in less than 15 years could probably do with a few less administrators (3).

Local VA bureaucracies reflect the growth of central office and VISN bureaucracies. It is unclear what many of the hospital associate and assistant directors do other than sit in meetings. Most hospitals could do without them for a while. Similarly, compliance officers and patient "advocates" really serve no purpose. Despite multiple patient complaints about wait times, the lack of action that led to the VA scandal demonstrates that they are not effective. There are also some physicians and nurses who do not see patients. For example, most VA Chiefs of Staff do not see patients. Nursing administration is bloated with "clip board" nurses who do little than attend meetings and create an ever increasing, and seemingly never ending, stream of paperwork for nurses who are already overworked. Surely, we could do without some of these people. 

It seems unlikely that VA officials will implement any meaningful cost savings. Instead they will try to preserve the status quo by petitioning Congress to allow them to shift clinical funds depriving veterans of healthcare. That includes using funds from a new program that was a priority for congressional Republicans called the “Choice Card”. This program allows certain veterans to obtain taxpayer-funded care from private doctors. VA administrators have blamed the budget shortfall on this program along with a new treatment for hepatitis C (1). The VA has been accused of dragging its feet on the Choice program and once again appears to be trying to sabotage the program and keep the funds. Gibson said in the interview that in future years more money will also be needed. He said he intended to tell lawmakers, “Veterans are going to respond with increased demand, so get your checkbooks out.”

VA administrators appear more concerned with keeping money inside their dysfunctional agency than caring for vets. Based on past history, Congress will probably let the VA shift the money and none of the recommendations above will happen. If furloughs occur, they will be lower level employees and result in little financial saving. Of course, administrative bonuses will be hefty this year because in their eyes, the administrators have successfully averted a financial crisis. Unless there are some fundamental changes made at the VA, the trend of the last 20 years of bloating the bureaucracy at the expense of healthcare will continue.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

References

1. Oppel, RA Jr. Wait lists grow as many more veterans seek care and funding falls far short. New York Times, June 20, 2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/wait-lists-grow-as-many-more-veterans-seek-care-and-funding-falls-far-short.html (accessed 6/24/15).
2. Robbins RA. VA administrators breathe a sigh of relief. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(6):336-9. [CrossRef]
3. Kizer KW, Jha AK. Restoring trust in VA health care. N Engl J Med 2014;371:295-7. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 

Reference as: Robbins RA. Time for the VA to clean up its act. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(6):350-1. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc088-15 PDF

Eliminating Mistakes In Managing Coccidioidomycosis

Tim Kuberski MD, FIDSA

Maricopa Medical Center

Department of Internal Medicine,

Infectious Diseases

2501 East Roosevelt Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85008

This editorial is in response to the article "Common Mistakes in Managing Pulmonary Coccidioidomycosis" by Drs. Galgiani, Knox, Rundbaken and Siever (1).  These authors are eminently qualified to discuss the management of pulmonary coccidioidomycosis. However, these “mistakes” have been made for many years and, truth be known, the authors probably made some of those mistakes when faced with their first patient with a serious Coccidioides infection. What obviously is missing from these experts are solutions to keep the mistakes from happening. I would like to fill in the deficit by offering remedies for important issues raised by the article, and more.

Who am I to offer solutions? I am board-certified in Infectious Diseases (therefore, qualified). I went into private practice in Phoenix 35 years ago solely doing Infectious Disease consultations. As a consequence I am pretty sure I have seen more patients with coccidioidomycosis (I can spell it 4 c’s, 4 i’s and 4 o’s; abbreviated by me as “coccy” which avoids the often used contraction of “cocci” which applies to a completely different pathogen) than anyone in the world. I am not smarter, but there are 5 million people in Phoenix and they all get coccy - this qualifies me as experienced. In addition, I was Clinician of the Year for the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) in 2007 (validation as a clinician and not a kook). My perspectives have evolved as a problem-solving clinician in the coccidioidomycosis trenches. Early on I quickly came to the conclusion that the IDSA guidelines for the treatment of coccidioidomycosis were of value only to lawyers and administrators, more about that later. Let’s get started on solutions.

Number 1.  To get a license to practice medicine (all specialties) in Arizona you have to demonstrate proficiency in coccidioidomycosis. Before coming to Phoenix I spent some time defending my country in Hawaii and I had to get a medical license to practice medicine in Hawaii. At that time, Hawaii licensure required “proficiency” in leprosy. You were given a booklet on leprosy and then you were given the choice of watching a movie on leprosy or actually seeing patients with leprosy, I chose the latter. Then you had to pass a written test on the diagnosis of leprosy. It must have helped because that test is no longer required and there are no Hansen’s Disease patients on Molokai. Implementing a similar proficiency test for coccy licensure in Arizona might require legislation which should not be too difficult since most of the legislators have either had Valley Fever or heard about it. It would be one of the few things of educational value about getting a medical license to practice medicine in Arizona.

Number 2. Develop a reference laboratory solely for Coccidioides testing.  Even if you do everything right in managing coccy, one of the major impediments to the management of coccy is a lack of a rapid and accurate test for the disease. A not un-common scenario (i.e., “mistake”) is a primary care physician, recently moved to Arizona and trained elsewhere sees a patient on a Friday evening as an outpatient. The patient has a mild community-acquired pneumonia and has an occasional wheeze on examination. The patient gets oral doxycycline and a short course of steroids and told to schedule a follow up appointment in a week. A coccy serology is too frequently not ordered, but if it is done, the results will come back in a minimum of 4 days later and often still does not get back to the physician in a timely way. Follow up does not happen as the steroids made the patient feel better - for a while. The next time the physician finds out about the patient, the coccy has disseminated or a letter is received from a lawyer. The point is that serology for coccy is inaccurate too often and the turn-around time too long. Some of the smaller hospitals do not do coccy serology testing on a daily basis and/or on the weekend. That means patients with a fulminant pneumonia in the ICU do not get a serologic diagnosis until precious time has passed. The solution is a reference laboratory that does only coccy-related tests rapidly and accurately. In my experience, non-clinicians like laboratory directors and pathologists decided the fate of coccy serology. Over the years I have had meetings with every hospital in Phoenix (more than 10) about the status of their coccy testing generally without sustained success. These tests need to be taken out of the hands of hospitals and commercial laboratories. The vast majority of my complicated coccy patients have had their serology tests done by Dr. Demo Pappagianis at his coccy laboratory at the University of California at Davis. These patients were followed by serologies done at that laboratory for over 20 years with amazing consistency and accuracy, illustrating that it can be done. A good businessman with good technicians under the right circumstance should monopolize coccy testing to the benefit of the Arizona community.

Number 3. Arizona needs a coccidioidomycosis registry. Perhaps now that there is a medical school in Phoenix, an effort can be made to collect better clinical and epidemiologic data on cases to enable clinical trials on the treatment of coccy. I mentioned the IDSA guidelines for the treatment of coccidioidomycosis previously. Those guidelines are on the basis of expert opinion and not much validated science – there are no double-blind controlled studies on the treatment of any type of infection due to coccy. If you are a physician dealing with a patient with disseminated coccy and have no experience with the disease – those guidelines are of no substantial help. The IDSA guidelines should be abandoned and substituted with a good review on the treatment of coccy written by Dr. Galgiani and if you are still lost, call the Valley Fever Centers of Excellence for advice. Huge amounts of time and money are squandered on these guidelines.  A coccy registry – similar to a tumor registry, would provide the opportunity to do good clinical studies in Phoenix because of its population base.

Since coccy is a reportable disease in Arizona there should be an effort to establish more detailed information on patients hospitalized in Arizona. Most major hospitals have infection control nurses who are accustomed to data collection. I propose they fill out more detailed information on patients hospitalized with complicated coccy. The infection control nurses should be incentivized by compensating the infection control department for each report. There is much more information that could be collected (i.e., socio-economic impact) on the various forms of coccy. You get the picture. Since Arizona has the most reported cases of coccy in the Country we should be the leader in coccy and related issues.

Another interesting observation is that there are many more deaths in Arizona due to coccy than Ebola. Considering the amount of money given to Arizona devoted to Ebola, we need to develop a registry for Ebola and coccy, since we will never see a case of Ebola. In addition, when a coccy patient is entered into the registry a serum specimen should be collected and maintained at the reference laboratory for seroepidemiologic and other studies for emerging new tests and research.

Conclusions

The usual excuses for not implementing these suggestions are there is no money and/or time. However implementing these three recommendations would do more for coccy in Arizona and help resolve the “mistakes” made by its physicians than anything that has happened in the past 35 years. Money will always be an issue, but implementing mandatory proficiency in coccy should not be too difficult by absorbing it into the licensure process. A central coccy laboratory should be self-sufficient if run as a business. A coccy registry would need “orphan disease” status to get start up funds and should be maintained ideally by the new medical school in Phoenix and/or the Valley Fever Centers of Excellence. It will require experts like the authors, the Arizona legislature, Maricopa Medical Society and the new medical school to join forces to make Arizona a leader in all things coccy – except “mistakes”.

Reference

1. Galgiani JN, Knox K, Rundbaken C, Siever J. Common mistakes in managing pulmonary coccidioidomycosis. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(5):538-49. [CrossRef] 

Reference as: Kuberski T. Eliminating mistakes in managing coccidioidomycosis. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10:250-2. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc062-15 PDF

A Tale of Two News Reports

On Wednesday, February 25, 2015 two new stories aired, one on National Public Radio (NPR) that I heard riding home that afternoon and the other later in the evening on the CBS Evening News with Scott Pelley. Both stories were on the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) but I was struck by the contrasting style of the two reports.

The first story was an NPR report on back injuries in nurses (1). According to the report nurses suffer more back injuries than almost any other occupation — and they get those injuries mainly from doing the everyday tasks of lifting and moving patients. The report stated that the VA has invested over $200 million in protecting nurses predominately by providing lifts and other devices for moving patients. VA hospitals across the country have reduced nursing injuries from moving patients by an average of 40 percent since the program started. The reduction at the Loma Linda hospital where the report was focused was closer to 30 percent — but the injuries that employees suffered were less serious than they used to be. Loma Linda spent almost $1 million during a recent four-year period just to hire replacements for employees who got hurt so badly they had to go home. However, this past year they spent nothing because according to the report nobody got hurt badly enough to miss work.

The VA's reputation for accurate information has been called into question. The Phoenix VA was the ground zero of an investigation which eventually discovered that about 70% of VA hospitals were falsifying patient waiting reports (2). Perhaps everything in this NPR report is true, however, the NPR report reminded me of so many I heard over the past two decades where any medical report was accepted by the media at face value. Many of the reports I knew were not true because I worked at the VA. There are several reasons to be skeptical. First, it is from the VA. Second, the director of the Loma Linda VA was Donald F. Moore until late 2012. Prior to that position Moore had been the director of the Phoenix VA. Third, the reported drop in injuries borders on the unbelievable. Nursing supervisors likely need to get approval to replace injured nurses.  Perhaps a directive either not to report any back injuries or that approval of replacement nurses would not be granted was issued. There are many ways to falsify the data, but NPR was nonquestioning in their report.

Later that evening CBS Evening News correspondent Wyatt Andrews reported that he found widespread mismanagement of VA claims. The mismanagement resulted in veterans being denied the benefits they earned, and many even dying before they get an answer from the VA (3). Five whistleblowers at the Oakland, California, Veterans Benefits office told CBS News that more than 13,000 claims filed between 1996 and 2009 ended up stashed in a file cabinet and ignored until 2012. VA supervisors in Oakland ordered marking the claims "no action necessary" and to toss them aside. Whistleblowers said that was illegal. Last week, the VA inspector general confirmed that because of, "poor record keeping" In Oakland, "veterans did not receive... benefits to which they may have been entitled." How many veterans is not known, because thousands of records were missing when inspectors arrived. In the last year, the inspector general has found serious issues in at least six VA benefits offices, including unprocessed claims in Philadelphia, 9,500 records sitting on employees' desks in Baltimore and computer manipulation in Houston to make claims look completed when they were not. VA Central Office said in a statement, "..electronic claims processing [has] transformed mail management for compensation claims ... greatly minimizing any risk of delays due to lost or misplaced mail...For any deficiencies identified, steps are taken to appropriately process the documents and correct any deficiencies." Much of this sounded very familiar and similar to the patient wait times the VA falsified last year.

The CBS report closed with a statement from the Veterans service organization Veteran Warriors, which advocates for veterans who are having difficulty with their claims. The Veteran Warriors said in a statement: "Too many cases have come to light, wherein the VA leaders have destroyed, deleted, hidden and manipulated veterans claims - their very access to benefits and services - and NOT ONE OF THEM has been criminally charged. It is time for our nations' leaders to stop listening to the endless "lip service" of accountability and demand answers. If they do not get them, it is time for repercussions to be felt by those who obviously believe they are above the law and insulated from prosecution." It was clear that the Veteran Warriors did not believe the VA and also clear that neither did CBS News.

The weak reporting on medical issues has been apparent to me for some time. The CBS report suggests that this may be changing. The VA scandal may point out that medical reports need to questioned just like other news stories. Truthfulness does matter and the VA continually blaming clerks and other lower level employees for administrative inadequacies or attacking the whistleblower has become tedious. Even the present inspector general's report blamed the closing of the Veterans claims on "poor record keeping". In this instance CBS news was doing their job questioning the VA but NPR was not.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor

SWJPCC

References

1. Zwerdling D. At VA hospitals, training and technology reduce nurses' injuries. NPR. February 25, 2015. Available at: http://www.npr.org/2015/02/25/387298633/at-va-hospitals-training-and-technology-reduce-nurses-injuries (accessed 3/7/15).
2. Robbins RA. A veterans day editorial: change at the VA? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(5):281-3. [CrossRef]
3. CBS News. Whistleblowers: Veterans cheated out of benefits. February 25, 2015. Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/veteran-benefits-administration-mismanagement-uncovered-in-investigation/ (accessed 3/7/15).

Reference as: Robbins RA. A tale of two news reports. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(3):143-4. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc038-15 PDF

The Hands of a Healer

The article in this month’s SWJPCC - "Physical Examination in the Intensive Care Unit. Opinions of Physicians at Three Teaching Hospitals" (1), is a fascinating insight to medical practice and how it has changed with the advent of new technology. The study at three large teaching facilities addressed the questions of how often a physical exam was performed in the ICU, what the perceived utility of the physical exam was, who examines patients most,  and an interesting question pertaining to what exactly constitutes a physical exam. Participants were given theoretical scenarios and answered questions pertaining to the role of a physical exam.  Even though the format was a questionnaire and not direct observation, the results support what I see in clinical practice. The results show that the physical exam, at least in the ICU, is not deemed a critical tool in our armamentarium and that reliance on technology has supplanted the traditional exam. One point that has yet to be formally addressed by this or other studies, is actually how often the physical exam changes the clinical course.

Those of us in my generation remember the days when physical exam was paramount. Indeed, when I was in medical school in England, it was essential and when we presented cases, we had to make a differential diagnosis solely based on the history and physical exam, and then, and only then, would we order specific tests. That was about 25 years ago in London. I suspect that many of my colleagues from that era or earlier, had similar experiences. Modern US practice is to use the physical exam, order a battery of tests and imaging, then come up with the diagnosis.  It has not been shown unequivocally that our reliance on modern imaging and labs is necessarily better.

There are still some scenarios that no laboratory test can pick up. Even in pulmonary medicine, we still teach to treat the patient, not the ABG; and the diagnosis of respiratory failure does not require anything other than a look at the patient. Wheezing shows up on no commonly use lab or imaging in the ICU (excluding less commonly used techniques such as measurement of respiratory system resistance using the ventilator’s sensors and algorithms). There is no question that modern testing is more accurate and provides much more information to us than any, even Oslerian levels of clinical examination could. It also leads to work ups for incidentalomas that may have no real relevance. Conversely all of us probably have anecdotal stories of an exam changing the course. For example, I recall the physical exam that picked the cause of the patient’s agitation, an ulcer on the back of a ventilated, heavily sedated patient. This led to less use of benzodiazepines and a focus on pain control perhaps preventing or mitigating the clinical detriments of excess sedative use in the ICU.

Ordering tests and imaging is usually quicker for the MD than doing a physical exam – one can order three CT scans on three patients in less time than it takes to physically go and exam three patients. This is clearly an improved efficiency for the MD’s work load. The question is then whether the improved efficiency for the MD and added information about the patient from the ancillary testing is worth the extra cost. The physical exam is free except insofar as the time it takes and the effect this has on billing, i.e. that it is still a necessary part of the billing matrix.

The nature of what is a physical exam is also changing. Incorporating bedside imaging with ultrasound is no more a stretch than was incorporating the auscultatory findings when the stethoscope was first introduced. Palpation and percussion in this study, were not deemed necessary parts of the physical exam, which is in sharp contrast the traditional teaching. The perception amongst US physicians that physical exam is more utilized outside the US (England being a typical example) may or may not be true. From the results of this particular study, it seems not to be the case, as there was no difference in responses amongst those who had medical school training outside the US. However even currently, it is impossible to progress in England to higher postgraduate training MRCP or FRCP (member or fellow of the Royal College of Physicians) without being grilled on a physical exam (2).

So where then is the correct balance? As the authors point out, the classic physical findings we were taught are usually present in extreme or end stage disease whereas our purportedly better technology now finds these processes earlier in the clinical course. Pure reliance on either the physical exam or the ancillary testing is not likely to be the correct approach. The answer has yet to be ascertained. A study addressing how often the clinical exam changes the course of a patient’s care significantly (however one may define this) has yet to be done. My prediction is that within 20-30 years, the physical exam will be almost never done in clinical practice.

Clement U. Singarajah, MD

Associate Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Vazquez R, Vazquez Guillamet C, Adeel Rishi M, Florindez J, Dhawan PS, Allen SE, Manthous CA, Lighthall G.  Physical examination in the intensive care unit: opinions of physicians at three teaching hospitals. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(1):34-43. [CrossRef]
2. Royal College of Physicians of the United Kingdom. MRCP(UK) part 2 clinical examination (paces) guide notes for candidates 2014. Available at: http://www.mrcpuk.org/sites/default/files/documents/Candidate%20guide%20notes%202014_1.pdf (accessed 1/6/15).

Reference as: Singarajah CU. The hands of a healer. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(1):32-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc002-15 PDF

The Fabulous Fours! Annual Report from the Editor

With the end of 2014, the Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care (SWJPCC) completed its fourth year of operation. Our first manuscript was posted on November 11, 2010. We posted 8 manuscripts our first year, 68 in 2011, 113 in 2012 and 164 in 2013 and 167 in 2014 (Table 1).

Table 1. Yearly submissions, total postings and postings by category.

Accompanying our increase in manuscripts, our readership continues to steadily grow, although comparisons to previous years is difficult because the methodology changed in February, 2014 (Table 2).

Table 2. Page views, visits and audience size by month 2014.

SWJPCC continue to evolve and we made some changes in 2014:

• The California Thoracic Society partnered with SWJPCC.
• We added additional associate editors in pulmonary, critical care and imaging from Fresno (Peterson), Albuquerque (Boivin) and Tucson (Arteaga).

Many need to be thanked. First, thanks to our authors. Second, SWJPCC, like all journals, relies upon expert reviewers in order to publish the highest quality manuscripts. We thank the reviewers for their time and effort in the prompt submission of their reviews. A list of reviewers for 2014 is below.

• David Baratz
• Bhaskar Bhardwaj
• Michel Boivin
• Janet Campion
• Gordon Carr
• Michael Gotway
• Steve Klotz
• James Knepler
• Timothy Kuberski
• Manoj Mathew
• Jarrod Mosier
• Michael Peterson
• Robert Raschke
• Julene Robbins
• John Roehrs
• Clement Singarajah
• Karen Swanson
• Henry Tazelaar
• Dona Upson
• Carolyn Welsh
• Lewis Wesselius

Our gratitude goes to the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado and California Thoracic Societies and the Mayo Clinic Rochester for their support. Thanks to our associate editors who have put in much more work than we had the right to ask. A special note of thanks to those who continue to do regular features in SWJPCC-Bob Raschke and Manoj Mathew for the critical care and pulmonary journal clubs; Mike Gotway, Lew Wesselius and Bob Raschke for the cases of the month; Michel Boivin for the ultrasound for critical care physicians; and Ken Knox for the Medical Image of the Week. SWJPCC acknowledges the Phoenix Pulmonary and Critical Care Research and Education Foundation which has provided the monetary support for SWJPCC, Squarespace our web host, CrossRef for generating the digital object identifiers (doi's) and CLOCK SS for archiving. Last, and most importantly, thanks to our readers. Please visit as often as you can and feel free to provide us with your input.

What’s ahead for 2015? We hope to improve the content, especially the scientific content, for 2015, but we will continue to emphasize clinical medicine and education. Sleep submissions have been lagging and we hope to increase the number of submissions. CME will continue to be offered for the previous 12 Pulmonary, Critical Care, and Imaging Cases of the Month for a total of 36 CME offerings at any one time. We would welcome suggestions for any improvements.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

Reference as: Robbins RA. The fabulous fours! annual report from the editor. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;10(1):8-10. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc001-15 PDF

A Veterans Day Editorial: Change at the VA?

"Meet the new boss,

Same as the old boss.

Won't Get Fooled Again!"

            -Peter Townshend

Today we honor our veterans. A year ago VA patients languished on waiting lists waiting for healthcare. VA administrators hid the truth at over 100 VAs and took bonuses for meeting their wait time goals. Money has been poured into the VA, patients in rural areas are seen outside the VA, and it is now supposedly easier to fire other senior VA officials. Dennis Wagner authored an article in the Arizona Republic that claimed the VA has made some changes but more changes are needed (1). I agree with the need for change but would argue that there has been no real change at the VA.

Last week I saw a VA patient in my private practice. He was paying for tiotropium or Spiriva®, a long-acting anticholinergic used in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, out of his pocket. He was under the impression that the VA did not "carry" tiotropium. I told him that this was not true and that he should go to the VA and ask to be seen in pulmonary clinic if his primary care physician could not prescribe tiotropium. He was sent to the pharmacy where the pharmacist wanted to know why I would prescribe this expensive drug. He was sent back to my office for a response. I xeroxed a copy of my notes and gave them to the patient. I do not know whether he got the tiotropium but my guess is that probably not without some hassle. This is unchanged from prior to the scandal when patient care was undermined by healthcare support staff. No real change there.

Last night, the new Secretary of the VA, Robert McDonald, was on "60 Minutes" (2). He announced that he is "reorganizing" the VA. Although details were not stated, this sounded mostly like a consolidation of websites, not a bad thing, but hardly a "reorganization". He also said how sorry he was for past mistakes and how the new VA was going to do better. I had déjà vu going back to the mid 90's with Ken Kaiser's "Prescription for Change" (3). Eric Shinseki, the VA secretary recently forced to resign, used similar rhetoric and was "mad as hell" at the falsified wait lists (4). No real change there.

McDonald used the term "customers" to refer to VA patients (2). This has occurred off and on since the mid 90's and is a term some healthcare providers find offensive. We do not flip burgers at McDonald's and find it inappropriate and offensive to equate healthcare professionals with businessmen selling Charmin, Luvs, Pampers, Gillette razors, Covergirl makeup, etc. No real change there.

Earlier this week, the VA named a new director at the Phoenix VA, ground zero of the VA scandal (5). He is the former director of the Milwaukee VA and director of the VA's Rocky Mountain regional network, apparently coaxed out of retirement to serve for about a year as director at the troubled medical center. He replaces two directors who served a matter of months. While director at the Rocky Mountain VA region he named Cynthia McCormack, former chief of nursing at the Phoenix VA, as director of the Cheyenne VA (6). Cheyenne was second only to Phoenix in having the widespread falsification of wait times discovered. Sharon Helman, the Phoenix VA director sits at home suspended while collecting a paycheck but McCormack appears to continue to direct the Cheyenne VA. No real change there.

Although a handful of administrators have been fired by the VA, the data falsification was rampant, with most VAs apparently falsifying their records (2). Yet these administrators retain their jobs and continue to rule their healthcare empires. McDonald claimed that names had been turned over to the Department of Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ declined to prosecute, and that administrative law judges were blocking the firing of administrators (2). No real change there.

The VA still functions with a lack of oversight. Congressmen make statements and issue press releases when politically convenient. The VA office of inspector general (VAOIG) still does investigations in response to whistle-blowers. After turning over their findings to VA central office to water down, the VAOIG usually makes some recommendations that are quickly accepted but not acted on by the VA (7). No real change there.

Lastly, there is the popular media. For years we heard about Ken Kizer's "Prescription for Change" and the miracle of the transformation to the VA (3,8). This infuriated many of us who knew it was not true (9). We wondered why the press was so accepting of the claims. They certainly are not on other political issues. However, in this case Dennis Wagner of the Arizona Republic, CNN and several other news sources stayed with the story and ferreted out the truth. Real change there. Hopefully, news media with continue their investigative reporting and question VA officials when they put forth self-serving data that is difficult to believe. This is my hope and may be the only result of the VA scandal that will force change. Hopefully the media "won't get fooled again".

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Wagner D. Much change in wake of VA scandal; more needed. Arizona Republic. November 8, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/investigations/2014/11/08/phoenix-va-scandal-changes/18716281/.
2. 60 Minutes. Robert McDonald: cleaning up the VA. Aired November 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/robert-mcdonald-cleaning-up-the-veterans-affairs-hospitals/.
3. Kizer KW. Prescription for change. March 22, 1995. Available at: http://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/rxweb.pdf
4. Cohen T, Frates C. Shinseki 'mad as hell' about VA allegations, but won't resign. CNN. May 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/15/politics/va-scandal-eric-shinseki-preview/.
5. Wagner D. VA names new director for Phoenix medical center. Arizona Republic. November 4, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/04/phoenix-veterans-affairs-medical-center-interim-director-brk/18467665/.
6. Cheyenne VA Medical Center. Leadership team: Cynthia McCormack. Available at: http://www.cheyenne.va.gov/about/leadership.asp.
7. Robbins RA. A failure of oversight at the VA. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(3):179-82. [CrossRef]
8. Jha AK, Perlin JB, Kizer KW, Dudley RA. Effect of the transformation of the Veterans Affairs Health Care System on the quality of care. N Engl J Med. 2003;348(22):2218-27. [CrossRef] [Pubmed]
9. Robbins RA, Klotz SA. Quality of care in U.S. hospitals. N Engl J Med. 2005;353(17):1860-1. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 

Reference as: Robbins RA. A veterans day editorial: change at the VA? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(5):281-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc150-14 PDF

A Failure of Oversight at the VA

On September 8, 2014 the Washington Examiner reported that the Central Office of the VA was allowed to change language in the VA Office of Inspector General (VAOIG) report on delays in patient care at the Phoenix VA Medical Center (1). Crucial language that the VAOIG could not “conclusively” prove that delays in care caused patient deaths at a Phoenix hospital was added to its final report after a draft version was sent to agency administrators for comment. Rep. Jeff Miller, chairman of the House veterans' committee, said "there are significant differences between the final IG report and the draft version ...". The following day Richard Griffin, the acting VAOIG, vigorously defended the independence of his office and bristled at the allegations that the VA was allowed to alter his office's report. However, his denials and indignance seem disingenuous.

To understand why, we need to go back a few years. First, the Phoenix VA overspent its Fee Basis consult budget in 2010. This is the money budgeted to send patients outside the VA for care. To do this a request was filled out and reviewed. Although the Chief of Staff often reviews these requests, this responsibility was delegated to the associate chief of staff for ambulatory care, Keith Piatt. He nearly always approved these requests. Dr. Piatt had other duties including patient care and limited expertise in several of the areas he was requested to evaluate. Furthermore, poor accounting made if unclear if there was sufficient money to pay for these consults. However, rather than questioning why so many patients were outsourced, the VAOIG blamed the problem on the inadequacy of Dr. Piatt's reviews (2). Given this recent IG investigation, it is not surprising that the Phoenix VA administrators were reluctant to outsource patients.

Second, Sam Foote, the initial whistleblower at the Phoenix VA contacted VAOIG in October, 2013. However, according to Foote the VAOIG did not seem to take his allegations seriously, and did what appears to be a superficial investigation (1). So Foote went to the House Committee on Veterans Affairs this past February. Only after the scandal was made public did the VAOIG acknowledge the inadequate care at the Phoenix VA.

Third, the VA prematurely made press releases prior to the release of the VAOIG's final report attempting to exonerate their responsibility (1,3). The final VAOIG report, apparently altered by the VA, was "unable to conclusively assert that the absence of timely quality care caused the deaths of these veterans.” Although this would hardly seem to be an exoneration, media outlets widely reported that whistle-blower allegations were exaggerated and that veterans were not severely affected by wrongdoing at the Phoenix VA medical center. However, in several instances it would seem likely that delayed care contributed to premature patient deaths and would was questioned in a Senate hearing on September 10, 2014 (3).

Fourth, VAOIG investigators corroborated virtually every major allegation of wrongdoing submitted by the first whistle-blower, Dr. Sam Foote (3). Nevertheless, the report and congressional briefing papers contain passages that appear to criticize Foote and his credibility, emphasizing that "the whistle-blower did not provide us with a list of 40 patient names" referring to VA patients Foote said died while awaiting care in Phoenix. This passage was apparently added by VA Central Office. Foote said the portion of the report about him is "false and misleading" because he and other whistle-blowers provided 24 names to inspectors and explained where to identify16 more. The VA report acknowledged that Foote had supplied at least 17 names and that others could not be traced because documentation had been destroyed by VA employees. Rather than defending their indefensible actions, VA Central Office has apparently resorted to denial, indignance, and blaming the whistleblower.

Fifth, the VA continues to obfuscate and obstruct investigations. According to the VAOIG, managers at 13 VA facilities lied to investigators about scheduling problems and other issues and officials at 42 of the 93 sites engaged in manipulation of scheduling, including 19 sites where appointments were cancelled and then rescheduled for the same day to meet on-time performance goals (4). However, it remains unclear whether officials at the Phoenix and Cheyenne VAs have been fired or even suspended. Citing privacy issues, the VA has refused to comment. However, in 2011, Jack Bagdade, a Phoenix VA physician, was fired for violation of the Hatch Act (5). His firing was widely publicized locally. Bagdade was lobbying Senator John McCain for a new research building at the Phoenix VA. Bagdade forwarded an e-mail from McCain's office entitled "Drink Beer for John McCain". If Bagdade's termination for forwarding an e-mail was appropriate punishment (and I am certainly not saying that it was), then what is appropriate punishment for VA administrators who knowingly manipulated patient appointments for their own personal gain, altered records and then lied to investigators?

Several of the VA administrators involved are also licensed physicians and nurses. However, both the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners and Arizona Board of Nursing have been strangely silent. Altering medical records and then lying about it would seem to be a clear violation of the Arizona statues.

Congress also has to accept some responsibility for their lack of oversight. The problem of inadequate numbers of physicians has been known for years (6). Recently appointed VA Secretary, Robert McDonald, pointed out that the Phoenix VA has now hired 53 additional full-time employees in recent months to help alleviate the appointment backlog (4). He did not mention how many of these employees are physicians nor did he mention how many of the patients were outsourced. However, it seems likely that the hires were merely new administrative personnel to outsource the care of patients. One senior VA official who asked not to be identified said that morale at the VA is poor and doubted that the VA will be able to fill the multiple physician vacancies commenting "Who would want to work here?".

Congress passing a bill to make it easier to fire senior VA administrators suggests they realize there is a problem. However, the legislation still leaves the control of the money up to the very people who misspent it bringing about the present crises. It is also unclear who will do the firing. To date no administrators have been fired despite the law supposedly making this easier. It seems unlikely that any VA administrators are going to fire their colleagues for doing what they are probably also doing or know about. "One of the chief lessons of the VA scandal is that we cannot rely on VA, alone, to effectively identify and correct problems plaguing the department," said Rep. Jeff Miller, chairman of the house veterans' committee. "Oversight and feedback from outside stakeholders is crucial to ensuring VA delivers the benefits and services our veterans have earned." (7). I agree. However, it is doubtful based on their lack of action that either the VAOIG or VA Central Office will take any substantive action to hold those accountable for this scandal and its cover-up.  A reasonable solution is to establish a system for local oversight by physicians, nurses and patients (8). Rep. Miller is right, we cannot rely on the VA to fix this problem and oversight is crucial.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

References

1. Taupin M. IG let veterans affairs officials alter report to absolve agency in phoenix deaths. Washington Examiner. September 8, 2014. Available at: http://washingtonexaminer.com/ig-let-veterans-affairs-officials-alter-report-to-absolve-agency-in-deaths/article/2553035 (accessed 9/10/14).
2. VA Office of Inspector General. Review of Alleged Mismanagement of Non-VA Fee Care Funds at the Phoenix VA Health Care System. November 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-11-02280-23.pdf (accessed 9/10/14).
3. Wagner D. Critics: VA influenced Inspector General to change Phoenix report for spin-control. Arizona Republic. September 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/investigations/2014/09/10/report-phoenix-va-deaths-raises-questions/15375005/ (accessed 9/10/14).
4. Daly M. Watchdog: VA managers lied to investigators about delays. Associated Press. September 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/nation/politics/2014/09/09/watchdog-va-managers-lied-delays/15334159/ (accessed 9/10/14).
5. Kujz S. Valley doctor loses job over invitation to have beer with Arizona senator. ABC News. March 25, 2011. Available at: http://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/valley-doctor-loses-job-over-invitation-to-have-beer-with-arizona-senator (accessed 9/10/14).
6. Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54. Available at: /editorial/2012/5/5/va-administrators-gaming-the-system.html (accessed 9/10/14).
7. Jordan B. Congressman takes va oversight on the road. Military.com news. August 12, 2014. Available at: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/08/12/congressman-takes-va-oversight-on-the-road.html (accessed 9/10/14).
8. Robbins RA. VA administrators breathe a sigh of relief. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(6):336-9. [CrossRef] 

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. A failure of oversight at the VA. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(3):179-82. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc119-14 PDF

IOM Releases Report on Graduate Medical Education

On July 29 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a report on graduate medical education (GME) (1). This is the residency training that doctors complete after finishing medical school. This training is funded by about $15 billion annually from the Federal government with most of the monies coming from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The report calls for an end to providing the money directly to the teaching hospitals and to dramatically alter the way the funds are paid. Instead payments would be made to community clinics phased in over about 10 years. To administer the program, the report recommends the formation of two committees: 1. A GME Policy Council in the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health; and 2. A GME Center within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to manage the operational aspects of GME CMS funding. The later committee would administer two funds: 1. A GME Operational Fund to distribute ongoing support for residency training positions that are currently approved and funded; and 2. A GME Transformation Fund to finance initiatives to develop and evaluate innovative GME programs, to determine and validate appropriate GME performance measures, to pilot alternative GME payment methods, and to award new Medicare-funded GME training positions in priority disciplines and geographic areas.

If adopted, the plan would end decades of attempts by CMS to coerce medical school graduates into primary care, especially in rural, underserved areas. By controlling funding for GME training, CMS would be able to dictate how physician training. Negative reaction was expected and swift from the American Hospital Association, the American Medical Association and the American Council on Graduate Medical Education, whose members would lose CMS money (2-4). Also expected, the proposal was supported by the American Academy of Family Physicians whose members who would gain under the proposal (5).

The IOM committee has a point. Despite a growing public investment in GME, there are persistent problems with uneven geographic distribution of physicians, too many specialists, not enough primary care providers, and a lack of cultural diversity in the physician workforce. Furthermore, according to the report "a variety of surveys indicate that recently trained physicians in some specialties cannot perform simple procedures often required in office-based practice.”

However, can a committee formed by CMS be expected to improve the health of America? Based on the composition of the committee and their past performance we think not. First, the committee was co-chaired by Don Berwick who was head of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), CMS Administrator and presently a candidate for Massachusetts governor (6). During Berwick's tenure, the IHI proposed a number of non- or weakly evidence-based metrics. Many of these have been found to make no impact on patient-centered outcomes such as mortality, length of stay, readmission rates, morbidity, etc. (7). An example was the 18 month 100,000 Lives Campaign which according to Berwick prevented 122,300 avoidable deaths. However, the methodology, incomplete data and sloppy estimation of the number of deaths makes Berwick's claim dubious. Furthermore, when the campaign was expanded to the 5,000,000 Lives Campaign the "results" could not be reproduced. Also during Berwick's tenure, IHI prematurely championed tight control of blood sugar in the ICU, an intervention which resulted in a 14% increase in ICU mortality when properly studied (8). Undaunted, Berwick put many of these same meaningless metrics in place when he became administrator of CMS. One of these metrics, readmission rates, has been associated with a higher mortality (9). Now Berwick is running for Massachusetts governor. One wonders how politics might have affected the report.

Other members of the committee include the committee co-chair, Gail Wilensky, who was administrator of HCFA (the precursor of CMS), nurses, physician assistants, economists, a representative from industry and a number of academics. Missing were members of the large community of practicing physicians. It seems the IOM committee was assembled to produce a political rather than an evidence-based answer of how to solve patient care disparities. To paraphrase a well-known quote, the first casualty of politics is usually the truth. It seems likely that the proposed GME Center within CMS would have a similar composition to Berwick's present IOM committee and would likely offer political rhetoric rather than meaningful reform to GME. Similarly to those championed by Berwick at IHI and later CMS, we suspect that a series of meaningless metrics would be required that would do nothing other than add a paper burden to a medical system already drowning in paperwork. By removing local control, CMS will likely ignore local strengths. For example, the University of Colorado has an extremely strong pulmonary and critical care division. Although America needs this physician expertise, especially critical care, it seems likely that CMS might move these residency slots to family practice or general medicine. We believe that local control with appropriate incentives, is more likely to solve these problems than a centralized bureaucracy in Washington.

Lastly, a word about the report's claim graduates lack the skills to perform basic procedures. Our observations are similar and we are inclined to accept the claim. However, we point out that it was decisions of committees such as those proposed that required attending physicians to perform procedures in order to be reimbursed and that residents have fewer opportunities to perform procedures due to work hour restrictions. The committee's implication that somehow physician trainers are to blame seems quite disingenuous. Not identified in the report but crucial to physician development is developing skills to critically evaluate medical literature, rather than blindly follow the guidelines proposed by CMS, IHI or others of a similar ilk. 

The proposals in the IOM report are a bad idea from a committee whose head has been rife with bad ideas. The committee's report is not the "New Flexner Report" but will be the coffin nail in the death of quality, caring physicians if adopted.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Clement U. Singarajah, MD

Phoenix Pulmonary and Critical Care Research and Education Foundation

Gilbert, AZ

References

1. Institute of Medicine. Graduate medical education that meets the nation's health needs. July 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2014/Graduate-Medical-Education-That-Meets-the-Nations-Health-Needs.aspx (accessed 8/5/14).
2. American Hospital Association. IOM panel recommends new financing system for physician training. July 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.ahanews.com/ahanews/jsp/display.jsp?dcrpath=AHANEWS/AHANewsNowArticle/data/ann_072914_IOM&domain=AHANEWS (accessed 8/5/14).
3. Hoven AD. AMA urges continued support for adequate graduate medical education funding to meet future physician workforce needs. July 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2014/2014-07-29-support-graduate-medical-education-funding.page (accessed 8/5/14).
4. Kirch DG. IOM’s vision of GME will not meet real-world patient needs. July 29, 2014. Available at: https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/newsreleases/381882/07292014.html (accessed 8/5/14).
5. Blackwelder R. Recommended GME overhaul will support a physician workforce to meet nation’s evolving health needs. July 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.aafp.org/media-center/releases-statements/all/2014/gme-physician-workforce.html (accessed 8/5/14).
6. About Don. Available at: http://www.berwickforgovernor.com/about-don (accessed 8/5/14).
7. Robbins RA. The unfulfilled promise of the quality movement. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):50-63. [CrossRef]
8. NICE-SUGAR Study Investigators. Intensive versus conventional insulin therapy in critically ill patients. N Engl J Med 2009;360:1283-97. [CrossRef] [PubMed]

Reference as: Robbins RA, Singarajah CU. IOM releases report on graduate medical education. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(2):123-5. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc107-14 PDF

Mild Obstructive Sleep Apnea: Beyond the AHI

Joyce Lee-Iannotti MD

James M Parish MD

Division of Pulmonary Medicine (Dr Parish) Center for Sleep Medicine Department of Neurology (Dr Lee-Iannotti), Center for Sleep Medicine

Mayo Clinic Arizona

Scottsdale, Arizona

A common conundrum faced by sleep medicine practitioners is how to manage the large group of patients with mild sleep apnea. Many patients are referred for sleep evaluation, with symptoms thought to be due to obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). Often polysomnography demonstrates only mild sleep apnea, and the clinician and patient are faced with the dilemma of whether to use continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) therapy or an oral appliance. In making this important decision the clinician incorporates the commonly used definition of mild sleep apnea as an apnea-hypopnea index of between 5 and 14 apneas or hypopneas per hour of sleep.  Moderate sleep apnea is defined as 15-29 events per hour, and severe is 30 and above events per hour. These arbitrary thresholds originated in the early 1980s when knowledge of this condition was in its infancy and little was known about the long term health effects. The definition was based on the finding of apneas, defined by the complete cessation of airflow for at least 10 seconds. The concept of hypopnea and respiratory-effort related arousal (RERA) came later and with frequently changing definitions that have been the subject of significant controversy throughout the last 30 years.  Many sleep centers include these RERA’s in the definition of respiratory disturbance index, which is incorrectly used interchangeably with AHI. While the sleep literature has demonstrated the untoward effects of moderate to severe sleep apnea, there has been considerable debate about the clinical significance of mild sleep apnea, that is, an AHI between 5 and 15.

The current paper by Quan, et al (1) is a significant contribution to the literature in sleep medicine addressing this important clinical question. This paper reports data drawn from the APPLES study, a large multi-center, well-conducted study designed to determine if CPAP therapy improves sleepiness, mood disorder, or cognitive function in patients with OSA, that has subsequently produced several important publications (2-6). As part of the study, extensive data was obtained on each of these neurocognitive parameters including the Epworth Sleepiness Scale, Stanford Sleepiness Scale, Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, Profile of Mood States, and Sleep Apnea Quality of Life Index, all validated questionnaires used frequently in the sleep literature. In this part of the study, 199 patients with an AHI>5 but <15 were compared to 40 patients enrolled in the study, but with and AHI<5. The mean AHI was 10 per hour in the mild OSA group, and was 3 per hour in the non-OSA group.  Size of the study was statistically large enough to determine significant differences. Remarkably, there was no significant difference in any rating of sleepiness, mood, or quality of life between the two groups. This study produces an important challenge to the traditional thresholds of disease severity, and raises the question of whether mild sleep apnea based on AHI alone is a disease, and whether it truly requires treatment. Since many patients seen at sleep medicine clinics fall into this category, this is an extremely important question to address.

Several previous studies have attempted to elucidate the issue of mild sleep apnea. Barnes, et al (7) in a randomized controlled trial of CPAP in mild OSA (defined in their study as an AHI 5-30 events per hour) reported that CPAP improved self-reported symptoms of snoring, restless sleep, daytime sleepiness, and irritability, but did not improve objective measure of sleepiness (multiple sleep latency test) or any test of neurobehavioral function, quality of life, mood scores, or 24-hour blood pressure. Weaver, et al (8) reported results from the CATNAP study, a randomized, sham-CPAP controlled study of self reported sleepy patients with mild OSA (defined as AHI 5-30 events per hour) that CPAP significantly improved scores on the Functional Outcomes of Sleep Questionnaire. Both of these trials differ from the current study by defining mild OSA as an AHI up to 30 per hour, whereas the major controversy involves those patients in the AHI 5-15 range. The CATNAP study also selected patients who complained of excessive sleepiness.

The findings from this study emphasize the need to differentiate “obstructive sleep apnea” from “obstructive sleep apnea syndrome.”  Obstructive sleep apnea has been traditionally defined solely by the AHI, whereas OSA syndrome incorporates the subjective and clinical components to the diagnosis (sleepiness, mood disturbance, fatigue, etc.) An abnormal AHI in the mild range without symptoms may not warrant  treatment with CPAP, whereas an excessively sleepy patient with an AHI of 7 would require at least a trial of CPAP with close monitoring. Fatigue, although traditionally associated with mood disorders, is a common symptom in sleep medicine and may be a manifestation of untreated sleep apnea. Future studies could incorporate a fatigue scale (e.g. Fatigue Severity Score) as an adjunct to the Epworth sleepiness score to assess the importance of fatigue as a symptom of OSA.

The current study has an important limitation in that subjects were enrolled based on a referral to a sleep center for some clinical indication related to OSA, and therefore do not represent the general population. It would be possible that individuals drawn randomly from the general population would have lower scores on these tests than a group of subjects referred to a sleep center, which would result in the mild OSA group having significantly different scores on these tests than the general population. In addition the no-OSA group in this study included only 40 patients, and it is possible that a larger group of true no-OSA patients without symptoms causing referral to a sleep center would yield a slightly different result. However, if the untoward effects of mild OSA are indeed significant, it should be relatively easy to find significant abnormalities in mood, sleepiness, and quality of life, and the inability to demonstrate differences in this study group leads one to conclude that the differences, if they exist, are likely to very small.

Besides the mood and quality of life effects of sleep apnea, cardiovascular disease is known to be a significant consequence of obstructive sleep apnea (9).  Stroke, heart failure, myocardial infarction, and atrial fibrillation are known to occur more commonly in untreated OSA than in normal individuals (10). There have been several studies on the cardiovascular effects of mild sleep apnea. The Sleep Heart Health study found a small but significant increase in cardiovascular disease in mild sleep apnea (11).  In another study, Buchner et al (12) found CPAP reduced the risk of subsequent cardiovascular events in patients with mild to moderate (AHI 5-30 per hour) OSA. Therefore, the clinician must look at not only at the AHI, but the larger picture inclusive of presenting symptoms and cardiovascular and cerebrovascular risk factors when deciding on treatment.

Ultimately, this paper challenges the sleep community to look beyond the AHI and improve management algorithms for patients with mild obstructive sleep apnea, with or without symptoms. We propose that an obstructive sleep apnea score be developed, similar to the CHADS-2 score used to determine the need for anticoagulation in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation as a means of secondary stroke prevention (13). The “OSA score” could incorporate the AHI, the Epworth sleepiness scale, a quality of life score, a fatigue severity scale, and known cardiovascular and cerebrovascular co-morbidities. A point system could be generated to determine the need for CPAP or alternative therapies.

Hence, this study is likely to be a sentinel study in the sleep medicine literature. Further research in how to “score” patients who need treatment is needed in order to provide best value in management of sleep apnea.

References

1. Quan SF, Budhiraja R, Batool-Anwar S, Gottlieb DJ, Eichling P, Patel S, Wei Shen, Walsh JK, Kushida CA. Lack of impact of mild obstructive sleep apnea on sleepiness, mood and quality of life. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(1):44-56. [CrossRef]
2. Kushida CA, Nichols DA, Quan SF, et al. The Apnea Positive Pressure Long-term Efficacy Study (APPLES): rationale, design, methods, and procedures. J Clin Sleep Med 2006;2(3):288-300. [PubMed] 
3. Quan SF, Chan CS, Dement WC, et al. The association between obstructive sleep apnea and neurocognitive performance--the Apnea Positive Pressure Long-term Efficacy Study (APPLES). Sleep 2011;34(3):303-14B. [PubMed]
4. Kushida CA, Nichols DA, Holmes TH, et al. Effects of continuous positive airway pressure on neurocognitive function in obstructive sleep apnea patients: The Apnea Positive Pressure Long-term Efficacy Study (APPLES). Sleep 2012;35(12):1593-602. [PubMed]
5. Quan SF, Budhiraja R, Clarke DP, et al. Impact of treatment with continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) on weight in obstructive sleep apnea. J Clin Sleep Med. 2013;9(10):989-93. [PubMed]
6. Batool-Anwar S, Goodwin JL, Drescher AA, et al. Impact of CPAP on activity patterns and diet in patients with obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). J Clin Sleep Med. 2014;10(5):465-72. [PubMed] 
7. Barnes M, Houston D, Worsnop CJ, et al. A randomized controlled trial of continuous positive airway pressure in mild obstructive sleep apnea. Am J Resp Crit Care Med. 2002;165(6):773-80. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
8. Weaver TE, Mancini C, Maislin G, et al. Continuous positive airway pressure treatment of sleepy patients with milder obstructive sleep apnea: results of the CPAP Apnea Trial North American Program (CATNAP) randomized clinical trial. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2012;186(7):677-83. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
9. Newman AB, Nieto FJ, Guidry U, et al. Relation of sleep-disordered breathing to cardiovascular disease risk factors: the Sleep Heart Health Study. Am J Epidemiol. 2001;154(1):50-9. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
10. Somers VK, White DP, Amin R, et al. Sleep Apnea and Cardiovascular Disease: An American Heart Association/American College of Cardiology Foundation Scientific Statement From the American Heart Association Council for High Blood Pressure Research Professional Education Committee, Council on Clinical Cardiology, Stroke Council, and Council on Cardiovascular Nursing In Collaboration With the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute National Center on Sleep Disorders Research (National Institutes of Health). J Am Coll Cardiol. 2008;52(8):686-717. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
11. Shahar E, Whitney C, Redline S, et al. Sleep-disordered breathing and cardiovascular disease: cross-sectional results of the Sleep Heart Health Study. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2001;163:19-25. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
12. Buchner NJ, Sanner BM, Borgel J, Rump LC. Continuous Positive Airway Pressure Treatment of Mild to Moderate Obstructive Sleep Apnea Reduces Cardiovascular Risk. Am J Resp Crit Care Med. 2007;176(12):1274-80. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
13. Gage BF, Waterman AD, Shannon W, Boechler M, Rich MW, Radford MJ. Validation of clinical classification schemes for predicting stroke: results from the National Registry of Atrial Fibrillation. JAMA. 2001;285(22):2864-70. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 

Reference as: Lee-Iannotti J, Parish JM. Mild obstructive sleep apnea: beyond the AHI. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(1):40-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc099-14 PDF

Multidisciplinary Discussion (MDD) in Interstitial Lung Disease; Some Reflections

Thomas V. Colby MD*

Michael B. Gotway MD^†

Lewis J. Wesselius MD^‡

Departments of Pathology*, Radiology^†, and Pulmonary Medicine^‡

Mayo Clinic Arizona

13400 E. Shea Blvd.

Scottsdale, AZ 85259

Multidisciplinary discussion (MDD) has been used in many disciplines in medicine, notably in thoracic oncology for some two decades (1).  MDD at a multidisciplinary conference (MDC) formalizes activities that have also gone under the label of case conferences, tumor boards, etc. and this practice is time- honored in medical practice.  In the setting of interstitial lung disease (ILD), especially the idiopathic interstitial pneumonias (IIPs) and IPF MDD conducted by a “multidisciplinary team” (MDT) and is now the “gold standard” for diagnosis in this clinical setting (2) and is recommended in the 2011 guidelines for IPF and the 2013 guidelines for IIPs (3, 4). 

Clinical-pathologic correlation, clinical-radiologic-pathologic correlation and clinical-radiologic correlation have been integral to the study of interstitial lung disease since early work of  Heitzman (5), Carrington and Gaensler (6) and many others. This represents the conceptual framework on which the Fleischner Society:  “…an international, multidisciplinary medical society for thoracic radiology, dedicated to the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of the chest” founded in 1969 (7).

The emphasis of MDD in the setting of ILD derives primarily from the study of Flaherty et al (8).  Flaherty et al studied the kappa statistic for intra-observer agreement among expert clinicians evaluating ILD and showed that the kappa significantly improved as more clinical, radiologic and pathologic information was added, suggesting that clinicians had become more confident of their diagnoses with this process. 

In theory, MDD results in a consensus diagnosis based on all the appropriate evidence discussed in a single setting allowing a dynamic intercourse and engagement among the physicians involved.  It allows the physicians to “look each other in the eye” and assess the confidence in the interpretations presented.  It also enables all participating physicians to reassess and change their opinions on the basis of new information and ongoing discussion.  Many of the positive aspects of MDD include the following:

• Dynamic interaction with exchange of ideas
• Engagement of the physicians involved; improved self-esteem
• Physicians can gauge the confidence of others’ opinions/diagnoses (e.g., the radiologic or pathologic diagnosis)
• Physicians can reassess and reinterpret their findings and change their diagnoses
• Educational value for involved physicians (for example, surgeons can appreciate the radiologic findings in terms of where to biopsy; pathologists can appreciate the pathologic findings relative to HRCT)
• Educational value for training fellows and junior staff
• Encourages evidence-based approach
• Increased homogeneity and consistency in managing ILD
• Development of a group ethos with associated improved morale
• Continuous feedback regarding diagnoses
• Forum for developing research ideas
• Forum for discussion and recruitment to clinical trials
• Pooled group clinical experience with broad perspective on ILD (for example, radiologic findings inform the pathologic findings and vice versa)
• An MDD diagnosis might be considered a more defensible diagnosis than individuals’ diagnoses
• The belief that collective thought is better than individuals’ diagnoses

As in any human interaction, theory does not always translate into practice and there are number of issues that  arise with MDD.  Negative and potentially negative aspects of MDD can summarized as follows:

• Physician and allied health staff time
• Physician and allied health staff cost
• Difficulty in coordinating schedules to attend an MDD
• Too many (unselected) cases for discussion
• Lack of a defined protocol and administrative structure for the MDD
• How individual findings should be weighted in terms of final diagnosis
• The effect on the group of individuals’ personalities and stature
• Discourages independence of thought and problem-solving strategies especially for trainees
• Lack of a clear trail as to exactly how a final diagnosis was reached (individual opinions may be lost)
• The “groupthink” phenomenon (to maintain harmony and conformity a group decision may in fact be dysfunctional)
• Over-confidence by the clinician in a diagnosis reached by MDD
• Lack of data on inter- and intra-observer correlation for MDT diagnoses
• When no consensus diagnosis is reached, who is the final arbitrator?
• The phenomenon of “diagnosis drift” (see below)
• The difficulty in validating MDD/MDT diagnoses
• MDD is a luxury of an academic practice and not practical in routine clinical practice
• Medico-legal liability of group members for a group decision

The MDD process for ILD has not been uniformly defined.  Should this be a free-for-all?  Should there be a defined protocol?  The algorithm for the diagnosis of IPF in the 2011 guidelines is a good guide (3).  To some extent, the observations/opinions presented in an MDD are subjective and thus an MDD diagnosis is simply a collection of subjective judgments.  MDD is influenced by individual personalities and there is no question that an “eminence factor” may be at play; a very eminent radiologist may intimidate a relatively inexperienced clinician and the result might be skewed toward the radiologic interpretation.  Cultural factors may also be at play since in some societies age and experience are venerated.  There are no guidelines if a consensus is not reached, and it would be folly to assume that consensus would be reached after every MDD session. When there is no consensus, who is the final arbiter?  We believe the clinician caring for the patient should be the final arbiter. 

Participation in an MDD may leads to something that can be called “diagnosis drift.”  An example of this follows.  The differential diagnosis for IPF includes chronic hypersensitivity pneumonitis, which may show certain radiologic features that suggest that diagnosis.  When such cases are discussed in an MDD, pathologists then become sensitive to similar findings histologically and over time, tend to raise the differential of chronic hypersensitivity pneumonitis more often in the absence any validated confirmation of this practice.

How can MDD be improved?  Given the time, expense, and logistical issues, we think it is unrealistic to expect a MDD for all ILD or IPF cases and that cases for MDD should selected, particularly those where there appears to be discrepancy between the clinical, radiologic and/or pathologic findings. The availability of an electronic medical record (EMR) allows ready access to medical information that may obviate need for MDD in individual cases, although the give and take of discussion is lost.

An attempt should be made to better define the process and the roles of the participants.  We suspect that in most MDDs there is a de facto definition of the process and the roles, but some attempt could be made to formalize this.  Some additional suggestions include:

• Be cognizant of the pros and cons discussed above
• Better defined process with roles and leader clarified
• Preselection of cases to improve efficiency; not all ILD cases need to be discussed
• Include only individuals necessary for a given case (efficient use of staff and their time)
• Consider MDD “overreading” by an experienced group since many community practices will not find MDD to be feasible
• Use of teleconferencing
• Record of the MMD process/decisions
• Continuous reassessment and improvement of the MDD process

And as a final thoughts…..remember that an experienced clinician effectively goes through the process of MDD in the clinical evaluation of an individual patient, appropriately consulting radiologists, pathologists, and other colleagues as needed to reach a management decision……but how is that experience gained…?...The educational value of MDD should not be forgotten.

References

1. Powell HA, Baldwin DR. Multidisciplinary team management in thoracic oncology: more than just a concept? Eur Respir J 2014;43(6):1776-1786. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
2. Wells AU. Histopathologic diagnosis in diffuse lung disease: an ailing gold standard. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2004;170(8):828-829. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
3. Raghu G, Collard HR, Egan JJ, Martinez FJ, Behr J, Brown KK et al. An official ATS/ERS/JRS/ALAT statement: idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis: evidence-based guidelines for diagnosis and management. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2011;183(6):788-824. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
4. Travis WD, Costabel U, Hansell DM, King TE, Jr., Lynch DA, Nicholson AG et al. An official American Thoracic Society/European Respiratory Society statement: Update of the international multidisciplinary classification of the idiopathic interstitial pneumonias. Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2013;188(6):733-748. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
5. Heitzman ER. The lung: Radiologic-pathologic correlations. Mosby, 1973.
6. Carrington CB, Gaensler EA. Clinical-pathologic approach to diffuse infiltrative lung disease. Monogr Pathol 1978;19:58-87. [PubMed] 
7. Fleischner Society Website. [cited 2014 Jul 1]; Available from: http://fleischner.org/
8. Flaherty KR, King TE, Jr., Raghu G, Lynch JP, 3rd, Colby TV, Travis WD et al. Idiopathic interstitial pneumonia: what is the effect of a multidisciplinary approach to diagnosis? Am J Respir Crit Care Med 2004;170(8):904-910. [CrossRef] [PubMed]

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the Fleischner Society members attending the 2014 Leuven meeting and the following physicians for thoughtful discussion and input:  Jeffrey Galvin, David Hansell, David Lynch, Mathias Prokop, Jay Ryu, and Johny Verschakelen.

Reference as: Colby TV, Gotway MB, Wesselius LJ. Multidisciplinary discussion (MDD) in interstitial lung disease; some reflections. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(1):32-5. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc097-14 PDF 

VA Administrators Breathe a Sigh of Relief

On May 30, Eric Shinseki, the Secretary for Veterans Affairs (VA), resigned under pressure amidst a growing scandal regarding falsification of patient wait times at nearly 40 VA medical centers. Before leaving office Shinseki fired Sharon Helman, the former hospital director at the Phoenix VA, where the story first broke, along with her deputy and another unnamed administrator. In addition, Susan Bowers, director of VA Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 18 and Helman’s boss, resigned. Robert Petzel, undersecretary for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA, head of the VA hospitals and clinics), had resigned earlier. You could hear the sigh of relief from the VA administrators.

With their bosses resigning left and right, the VA leadership in shambles and the reputation of the VA  soiled for many years to come, why are the VA administrators relieved? The simple answer is that nothing has really changed. There for a moment it looked like real reform might happen. Even President Obama in announcing Shinseki's resignation said the "There is a need for a change in culture..." (1). Shinseki’s resignation would indicate that any action to change the culture is unlikely. Sure a few administrators, like Helman, will lose their jobs, perhaps a few patients will get outsourced to private practioners, but nothing is being done or proposed to change the VA culture. A new interim VA secretary was named and his tenure is likely to be lengthy since no confirmation appears to go unchallenged in the US Congress, and who would want the job?

I was at the VA, when then undersecretary for VHA, Kenneth Kizer, made the fundamental change that resulted in the present mess. Kizer had come to the VA with a program he called the “prescription for change” (2). Indeed, Kizer made several changes but the one that really counted was that the chiefs of staff, doctors who ran the medical services in VA hospitals, were replaced by the head of the Medical Administration Service, usually a business person. This made the VA director the monarch over their own little kingdom, and we all know “it’s good to be the king”. Furthermore, we all know that power corrupts and now with absolute power, the VA director was absolutely corrupted. The hospital directors eliminated any sources of potential opposition. Physicians who did not “play ball” could suddenly find themselves as a target of an investigation (3). After being found guilty by a kangaroo court, their names would be turned over to the National Practioner Databank as bad doctors making it difficult to find a job outside the VA. Those cooperative physicians were rewarded, often for limiting the care of patients. In other words, putting the VA administrators’ interests before the patients’ (4). Lastly, the long-standing relationship with the Nation’s medical schools was destroyed (remember VA dean’s hospitals?). It was argued that the medical schools used the VA to serve their needs. Although this had some truth, it is part of the two-way street that makes cooperation possible. No VA administrator wanted a bunch of doctors and academics telling them what to do.

After eliminating any possible oversight from the physicians or the medical schools, an insulating administrative layer had to be placed between the hospitals and VA central office. Therefore, the Veterans Integrated Service Networks or VISNs, were created. Although ostensibly to improve oversight and efficiency (2), only in Washington would they believe that another layer of bureaucracy would do either. As more and more patients were packed into the system, the numbers of physicians and nurses decreased (5). Not surprisingly, wait times became longer and there was no alternative but to hide the truth. The administrators, the VISNs and VA Central office were all complicit in these lies. Their bonuses depended on it and even when it was discovered by the VA Office of Inspector General (VAOIG) nothing was done.

Congress, who supposedly also provides oversight, was swift to propose action that does not change the VA culture and accomplish little. In this election year Congressional cries to throw those VA bums out have been consistent and loud. However, plenty of clues were available to know that the wait time data was false. First, the concept that you can cut the numbers of physicians and nurses and improve wait times defies common sense. Second, the VAOIG had repeatedly reported that wait times were being falsified. Helman had already been accused of this when she was the director at the Spokane VA (6). This week the Senate passed a bill allowing veterans to see private doctors outside the VA system if they experience long wait times or live more than 40 miles from a VA facility; make it easier to fire VA officials; construct 26 new VA medical facilities and use $500 million in unobligated VA funds to hire additional VA doctors and nurses (7). The VA already is able to do the first two, and as the present crisis illustrates, funds can be diverted away from healthcare. It seems likely this is exactly what will happen unless additional oversight is provided.

Kizer and Ashish Jha authored an editorial on this crisis in the New England Journal of Medicine this week (8). They made three recommendations:

1. The VA should refocus on fewer measures that directly address what is most important to veteran patients and clinicians-especially outcome measures.
2. Some of the resources supporting the central and network office bureaucracies could be redirected to bolster the number of caregivers.
3. The VA needs to engage more with health care organizations and the general public.

All these recommendations are reasonable. Outcome measures, not process of care, should be measured (9). Paying bonuses to administrators for clinicians completing these process of care measures should stop. Many of these measures serve mostly to increase administrative bonuses and not improve patient care. By giving administrators supervisory authority over physicians, healthcare providers were forced to complete a seemingly endless checklists rather than serve the patients' interests.

Bureaucracies should be reduced. VA's central-office staff has grown from about 800 in the late 1990s to nearly 11,000 in 2012 (8). VISN offices have reflected this growth with over 4500 employees in 2012 (10). This diversion of funds away from healthcare is the source of the present problem.

The VA needs to re-engage with the medical schools and with its patients. Reestablishment of the Dean's Committee or other similar system that provides oversight of the VA hospital directors and administrators may be one method of achieving this oversight. The association of the medical schools with the VA served the VA well from the Second World War until the 1990s (11).

Poor pay and micromanagement of physicians to perform meaningless metrics makes primary care onerous. Appropriating funds might improve the salary discrepancy between the VA and the private sector but will not fix the micromanagement problem. The VA may find it difficult to recruit the needed physicians and nurses unless a more friendly work environment is created. How do we know that any appropriated money will be spent on healthcare providers and infrastructure unless additional oversight is put in place? Without oversight the VA positions will become VA vacancies and the VA hospitals will become administrative palaces. Local oversight by VA physicians, nurses and patients is one method of ensuring that appropriated monies are actually spent on healthcare.

VA health care is at a crossroads. New leadership can help the VA succeed but only if the administrative structure is fixed changing the VA culture. Until this occurs the same administrative monarchs will continue to rule their realms and nothing will really change.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Cohen T, Griffin D, Bronstein S, Black N. Shinseki resigns, but will that improve things at VA hospitals? CNN. May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/30/politics/va-hospitals-shinseki/ (accessed 6/7/14).
2. Kizer KW. Prescription for change. March 1996. Available at: http://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/rxweb.pdf (accessed 6/7/14). 
3. Wagner D. The doctor who launched the VA scandal. Arizona Republic. May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/longform/news/arizona/investigations/2014/05/31/va-scandal-whistleblower-sam-foote/9830057/ (accessed 6/7/14).
4. Hsieh P. Three factors that corrupted VA health care and threaten the rest of American medicine. Forbes. May 30, 2014. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulhsieh/2014/05/30/three-factors-that-corrupted-va-health-care/ (accessed 6/7/14).
5. Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54. Available at: /editorial/2012/5/5/va-administrators-gaming-the-system.html (accessed 6/7/14).
6. Robbins RA. VA scandal widens. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(5):288-9. Available at: /editorial/2014/5/26/va-scandal-widens.html (accessed 6/7/14). 
7. O'Keefe E. Senators reach bipartisan deal on bill to fix VA. Washington Post. June 5, 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/06/05/senators-reach-bipartisan-deal-on-bill-to-fix-va/ (accessed 6/7/14).
8. Kizer KW, Jha AK. Restoring trust in VA health care. N Engl J Med. 2014 Jun 4. [Epub ahead of print]. Available at: http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1406852 (accessed 6/7/14). [CrossRef]
9. Robbins RA, Klotz SA. Quality of care in U.S. hospitals. N Engl J Med. 2005;353(17):1860-1. [CrossRef]
10. VA Office of Inspector General. Audit of management control structures for veterans integrated service network offices. March 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-10-02888-129.pdf (accessed 6/7/14).
11. VA policy memorandum no. 2: policy in association of veterans' hospitals with medical schools. January 30, 1946. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oaa/Archive/PolicyMemo2.pdf (accessed 6/7/14).

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Refence as: Robbins RA. VA administrators breathe a sigh of relief. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(6):336-9. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc077-14 PDF

VA Scandal Widens

On Memorial Day, which honors those who died in service to the country, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) is investigating medical facilities in at least 26 cities (1). The scandal started in Phoenix where Sam Foote, a retired VA physician, alleged that up to 40 patients in Arizona died awaiting care in a network where some veterans could not get appointments for more than a year. Foote claimed that Phoenix VA officials were misrepresenting wait times to collect bonus checks while maintaining "secret lists" of patients. These accusations resulted in the suspension of Sharon Helman, the Phoenix VA hospital director, along with her associate director and another unnamed senior administrator. Dennis Wagner in an article in the Arizona Republic listed many of the accusations made against various VA hospitals outside of Phoenix (1). These include:

• Chicago: Germaine Clarno, president of a federal employee union, said secret lists and falsified wait times had been an "everyday practice" at the Hines VA Hospital, and complaints of data fraud were ignored. Hellman was previously at the Hines VA director prior to coming to Phoenix. Clarno also said the inspector general conducted an inquiry, but targeted tangential issues. "The problem is the government covers up for the government — the OIG is a bed partner of VA administration." The OIG had investigated the Phoenix VA in late 2013 but Robert Petzel, then undersecretary for Veterans Healthcare Administration, said the OIG found no evidence to support Foote's claims (2). Petzel later resigned and the White House has nominated Jeffrey Murawsky who previously served as director of VA Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 12 which oversees the Hines VA and who directly supervised Helman (3).
• Walla Walla, WA: VA auditors who visited the Walla Walls VA, where Helman previously served as director prior to coming to Hines VA, identified improper and inconsistent patient-scheduling practices, according to the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin. A psychiatric nurse, who won a whistle-blower settlement after being terminated, told NBC News that intimidation and retaliation were commonplace at the medical center.
• San Antonio, Texas: Dr. Joseph Spann, who retired in January after 17 years with the VA, told federal investigators that physicians were regularly asked to alter the "request date" for medical procedures to hide backlogs for tests. Spann attributed the practice to pressure to meet performance measures that reward administrators bonuses. When told local VA officials had conducted a review and denied the allegation, Spann said, "Central Texas (VA) investigating itself is just worthless." Raymond Chung who was the previous Chief of Staff at the Phoenix VA came to Phoenix from San Antonio.
• Cheyenne, WY: Congressional investigators uncovered an e-mail written by a nurse to other VA employees describing techniques for "gaming the system" by falsifying appointment records to meet goals set by bosses. The nurse was suspended after the e-mail was made public. The director of the Cheyenne VA is Cynthia McCormack who previously was chief of nursing at the Phoenix VA.
• Fort Collins, CO: OIG investigators in December found that medical clinic staffers were trained to make it appear veterans were getting appointments within 14 days, per department guidelines, even though waits were longer. McCormack supervises the Fort Collins clinic.
• Albuquerque: U.S. Sen. Tom Udall, D-N.M., called for an investigation after allegations that  wait-time records were falsified Phoenix. Phoenix and Albuquerque are both supervised by Susan Bowers, the VISN 18 director.

As the above illustrates, the connections between these administrators is striking. Beginning several years ago, according to internal VA records, VA central office in Washington realized medical centers around the country were finding ways to manipulate the numbers. The VA had for several years been the subject of congressional inquiry and criticism not just due to long waits for care, but because of mismanagement but no action was taken.

Although Congress, VA central office in Washington and the local VISNs are all charged with overseeing the VA hospitals, the task of supervising this large, complex bureaucracy is daunting and appears to have been inadequate. A system needs to be put in place where healthcare providers who care for veterans and veteran patients who use the facility have a role in the oversight of their local VA hospital.  Creation of a hospital board of directors consisting predominately of healthcare providers from the facility and veterans might be able to provide the supervision that this ever widening scandal suggests is needed.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Wagner D. Delayed care, fraud point to ailing VA health system. The Arizona Republic. May 25, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/investigations/2014/05/25/va-medical-care-woes/9564605/ (accessed 5/26/14).
2. Wagner D. VA: We found no evidence to support allegations in Phoenix. The Arizona Republic. April 30,2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/30/phoenix-veteran-hospital-deaths-investigation/8518721/ (accessed 5/26/14).
3. O'Dell R, Nowicki D, The Arizona Republic. May 16, 2014. Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/16/top-va-health-official-resigns-under-fire/9182311/ (accessed 5/26/14).

*The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. VA scandal widens. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(5):288-9. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc070-14 PDF

Don’t Fire Sharon Helman-At Least Not Yet

Several developments have occurred over the past few days regarding prolonged wait times and secret lists at the Phoenix VA and its embattled director, Sharon Helman. President Obama has asked for an investigation and several Arizona Senators and Representatives have called for investigations and/or asked for the resignation of Helman and her administrative team (1,2). On 4/30/14, Dr. Robert Petzel, VA undersecretary for health, testified that an administrative team visited Phoenix soon after the controversy erupted and found “no evidence of a secret list… [or] patients who have died because they [were] on a wait list." (3). On 5/1/14 CNN posted an interview with Sharon Helman and her Chief of Staff, Dr. Darren Deering, who denied the allegations. Dr. Sam Foote, who made the original allegations, accused Helman and Deering of lying (4). CNN apparently confirmed Foote’s story with several sources inside the VA including a second physician, Dr. Katherine Mitchell (5). Later the same day, Eric Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, suspended Helman and two others (5).

This all sounded very familiar (6). In 2012 the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on the accuracy of the Veterans Healthcare Administration (VHA) wait times for mental health services (7). The report found that “VHA does not have a reliable and accurate method of determining whether they are providing patients timely access to mental health care services. VHA did not provide first-time patients with timely mental health evaluations and existing patients often waited more than 14 days past their desired date of care for their treatment appointment. As a result, performance measures used to report patient’s access to mental health care do not depict the true picture of a patient’s waiting time to see a mental health provider.”

After the 2012 OIG report came the inevitable Congressional hearing (8). Although misrepresenting actual wait times has been known for many years, there has been inadequate action to correct the practice according to the VA OIG. Sen. Patty Murray, then chair of the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, said the findings showed a "rampant gaming of the system." (8). A review of the OIG’s website revealed multiple instances of similar findings dating back to at least 2002 (6). In each instance, unreliable data regarding wait times was cited and no or inadequate action was taken.

The providers at the VA should not necessarily view this as not good news. The VA has usually sought to refocus blame away from the administrators to “lazy” or “poor” doctors. My guess is that we will soon see a number of accusations about Drs. Foote and Mitchell in an effort to administratively circle the wagons. VA administrators usually seize on such opportunities to control physicians. Remember the computer fiasco from several years back when an information technology administrator lost a computer with confidential patient information (9)? This not only resulted in information technology being placed in charge of the electronic healthcare record but a number of restrictions were placed on physician use of data. Furthermore, administrators can now not only regulate a physician’s salary but “black ball” physicians by false accusations through sources such as the National Practioner Data Bank (NPDB). Not surprisingly, physicians are reluctant to speak out when their livelihood can be threatened.

Clearly, the present system is not working. Firing Sharon Helman will solve nothing at the present other than giving some politicians the opportunity to congratulate themselves on weeding out a bad apple in this election year. Furthermore, firing Helman could be an attempt to hide a systemic problem by offering Helman as the “fall guy”. So instead of redoing the OIG investigations and the Congressional hearings which have accomplished nothing in the past, how about doing something else? Here are a few suggestions:

1. Have Helman investigated by an independent source, not the OIG. Examine other VAs for similarly misrepresenting patient wait times. Over thirty years at the VA taught me that if wait times are being "gamed" by one VA, the times are also likely being "gamed" by others.
2. Create a National Healthcare Administrator Data Bank similar to the NPDB with all the same safeguards and checks and balances available to physicians. Helman apparently had a history of misrepresenting data (10). It seems unlikely that she would have been hired if this was publically known.
3. Provide adequate oversight. The local Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN), VA Central Office in Washington, and Congress is not providing the oversight needed. Create a hospital board of directors consisting predominately of a majority of healthcare providers from the facility and Veterans (not to be appointed by the director) to provide oversight.
4. Quit hiring more administrators while reducing the number of doctors. Inadequate numbers of providers is the root cause of prolonged wait times and has been present for a number of years (6). The numbers of administrators, nurses and doctors should be transparent and publically available.
5. Quit paying administrators bonuses for work done by doctors. This only encourages cheating on reports (6,7). If administrators need a bonus, reward them for achievements in administrative efficiency or similar administrative goals. Both the criteria for and the amount of the bonus should be transparent and publically available.
6. Scrap the VISN system. These local collections of administrators are another source of waste and appear to add no real oversight or patient benefit.

The optimist in me hopes the situation at the Phoenix VA and possibly other VAs is thoroughly investigated. If Helman is the “bad apple” many would like to portray-then fire her. If her actions are more a result of a systemic problem-then fix the problem.  However, the cynic in me fears that Helman will be sacrificed without a thorough investigation and no change will occur.  In that case I will again be writing about an investigation of VA administrators "gaming the system", probably in 2016.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Wagner D. McCain, Flake call for Senate probe of Phoenix VA. The Arizona Republic. April 23, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/04/23/mccain-flake-call-senate-probe-phoenix-va/8061141/ (accessed 5/1/14).
2. Harris C, Wagner D. Phoenix VA officials deny there's a secret wait list; doctor says they're lying. The Arizona Republic. April 29, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/29/phoenix-va-director-congressman-call-for-removal/8447131/ (accessed 5/1/14).
3. Wagner D. VA: We found no evidence to support allegations in Phoenix. The Arizona Republic. April 30, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/30/phoenix-veteran-hospital-deaths-investigation/8518721/ (accessed 5/1/14).
4. Bronstein S, Griffin D, Black N. Phoenix VA officials deny there's a secret wait list; doctor says they're lying. CNN. May 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/health/veterans-dying-health-care-delays/ (accessed 5/1/14).
5. Wagner D. Second VA doctor blows whistle on patient-care failures. The Arizona Republic. May 1, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/investigations/2014/05/02/second-va-doctor-blows-whistle-patient-care-failures/8595863/ (accessed 5/1/14).
6. Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54.
7. VA Office of Inspector General. Review of Veterans’ Access to Mental Health Care. 1.http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-12-00900-168.pdf  (accessed 5-1-14).
8. Vogel S. VA mental health system sharply denounced at hearing. Washington Post. April 25, 2012. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/va-mental-health-system-sharply-denounced-at-hearing/2012/04/25/gIQAXG3mhT_story.html (accessed 5/1/14).
9. Lee C, Goldfarb ZA. Stolen VA laptop and hard drive recovered. Washington Post. June 30, 2006. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062900352.html (accessed 5/1/14).
10. Corbin C. Arizona VA boss accused of covering up veterans' deaths linked to previous scandal. Foxnews.com. April 24, 2014. Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/04/24/arizona-va-boss-accused-covering-up-veterans-deaths-linked-to-previous-scandal/ (accessed 5/1/14).

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Don't fire Sharon Helman-at least not yet. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(5):275-7. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc060-14 PDF

Questioning the Inspectors

In the early twentieth century hospitals were unregulated and care was arbitrary, nonscientific and often poor. The Flexner report of 1910 and the establishment of hospital standards by the American College of Surgeons in 1918 began the process of hospital inspection and improvement (1). The later program eventually evolved into what we know today as the Joint Commission. Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals have been inspected and accredited by the Joint Commission since the Reagan administration.

The VA hospitals often share reports regarding recent Joint Commission inspections and disseminate the reports as a "briefing". One of these briefings from a recent  Amarillo VA inspection was widely distributed as an email attachment and forwarded to me (for a copy of the briefing click here). There were several items in the briefing that are noteworthy. One was on the first page (highlighted in the attachment) where the briefing stated, "Surveyor recommended teaching people how to smoke with oxygen, not just discuss smoking cessation". However, patients requiring oxygen should not smoke with oxygen flowing (2,3).  It is not that oxygen is explosive but a patient lighting a cigarette in a high oxygen environment can ignite their oxygen tubing resulting in a facial burn (2,3). A very rare but more serious situation can occur when a home fire results from ignition of clothing, bedding, etc. (3).

A quick Google search revealed no data for any program teaching patients to smoke on oxygen. It is possible that the author of the "briefing" misunderstood the Joint Commission surveyor. However, the lack of physician, nurse and respiratory therapist autonomy makes it easy to envision administrative demands for a program to "teach people how to smoke on oxygen" wasting clinician and technician time to do something that is potentially harmful.

Although this is an extreme and absurd example of healthcare directed by bureaucrats, review of the remainder of the "briefing" is only slightly less disappointing. Most of the Joint Commission's recommendations for Amarillo would not be expected to improve healthcare and even fewer have an evidence basis. The Joint Commission focus should be on those standards demonstrated to improve patient outcomes rather than a series of arbitrary meaningless metrics. For example, a Joint Commission inspection should include an assessment of the adequacy of nurse staffing, are the major medical specialties and subspecialties readily accessible, is sufficient equipment and space provided to care for the patients, etc. (4-5).  By ignoring the important and focusing on the insignificant, the Joint Commission is pushing hospitals towards arbitrary and nonscientific care reminiscent of the last century. These poor hospital inspections will undoubtedly eventually lead to poorer patient outcomes.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

References

1. Borus ME, Buntz CG, Tash WR. Evaluating the Impact of Health Programs: A Primer. 1982. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Robb BW, Hungness ES, Hershko DD, Warden GD, Kagan RJ. Home oxygen therapy: adjunct or risk factor? J Burn Care Rehabil. 2003;24(6):403-6. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
3. Ahrens M. Fires And Burns Involving Home Medical Oxygen. National Fire Protection. Association. Available at: http://www.nfpa.org/safety-information/for-consumers/causes/medical-oxygen (accessed 3/12/14).
4. Aiken LH, Clarke SP, Sloane DM, Sochalski J, Silber JH. Hospital nurse staffing and patient mortality, nurse burnout, and job dissatisfaction. JAMA. 2002 Oct 23-30;288(16):1987-93. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
5. Harrold LR, Field TS, Gurwitz JH. Knowledge, patterns of care, and outcomes of care for generalists and specialists. J Gen Intern Med. 1999;14(8):499-511. [CrossRef] [PubMed]

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Questioning the inspectors. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(3):188-9. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc032-14 PDF

Qualitygate: The Quality Movement's First Scandal

Charles R. Denham is probably not a name familiar to most of our readers. Denham's name popped into the news when the Justice Department alleged that CareFusion, then a division of Cardinal Healthcare, paid Denham $11.6 million to influence the Safe Practices Committee at the National Quality Forum (NQF).

Dr. Charles R. Denham

Even though Denham may not be well known, readers might recognize the names of some of the organizations and individuals with whom Denham worked (2,3). Besides the NQF, these include the Institute of Medicine, Leapfrog Group, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Clinton Global Health Initiative, Discovery Channel, General Electric, Cleveland Clinic, Vanderbilt University Medical Center, Catholic Healthcare Partners, and Seton Medical Center. Prominent individuals associated with Denham include actor Dennis Quaid (whose newborn twins were nearly killed by a medication mistake) and Capt. Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger, famous for safely landing a crippled jetliner in the Hudson River. Lesser known, but prominent in the patient safety movement, are Dr. Kenneth Kizer (former Under Secretary for Health in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and founding president and former CEO of the NQF) and Dr. Donald Berwick (founder and former President of the Institute of Healthcare Improvement and former Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).

Denham is a member of the President's Circle of the National Academies of Science of the Institute of Medicine, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. He has been a Senior Fellow in the Advanced Leadership Initiative at Harvard University and instructor at the Harvard School of Public Health. He teaches leadership and innovation on the faculty of Harvard Medical School and was an adjunct Professor at the Mayo Clinic College of Medicine. He played a leadership role in the development of a computerized prescriber order entry (CPOE) simulator that measures performance improvement of hospital medication management systems, driving patient safety through healthcare information technologies. He founded CareMoms, CareKids, and CareUniversity, which are programs that are focused on helping families survive healthcare harm and waste. He was until very recently the editor of the Journal of Patient Safety (4).

Many groups have benefitted by recommending best practices, but an endorsement by the NQF can mean riches for companies and individuals (4). Created in 1999 at the behest of a Presidential commission, the Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit takes private donations and collects fees from members, including consumer groups, health plans and medical providers. Five years ago, Health and Human Services hired the NQF to endorse measures to show whether health care spending is achieving value for patients and taxpayers. The contract has since grown substantially and by 2012 made up nearly three-fourths of the organization’s $26 million in revenue. The NQF’s standards are widely adopted. The report produced by the committee Denham co-chaired included recommendations for best practices in 34 areas of care.

The quality movement is distancing itself from Denham and denying any knowledge of Denham's conflicts of interest or alleged kickbacks (5). However, there were multiple clues. Although Denham was trained as a radiation oncologist, he was not a practicing physician (6). Known as an entrepreneur, Denham had formed and folded numerous for-profit and non-profit companies. Those listed by the Texas Secretary of State’s office include the Texas Institute of Medical Technology; Health Care Concepts; TD Enterprises Management; Spectrum Holdings International (also known as Austin Liberty, Inc.); Tetelestai, Inc. (Greek for “It is finished,” a New Testament reference); Aircare International, Inc. (Denham at one time worked in the aviation industry); CRD Health Ventures, Inc.; and Assisted Better Living Everywhere, Inc. Denham and his family live in a palatial waterfront home in Laguna Beach, California, whose value Zillow estimates at $10.5 million (6). The speaker’s bureau lists Denham’s minimum fee for U.S. engagements as an average of $50,000 to $75,000, far in excess of usual physician speaking fees (6). Denham even boasted his own webpage on Wikipedia and had a contract with Celebrity Talent International (2,4). Although Denham's biography in Wikipedia claims over 100 scientific publications a quick check of PubMed reveals only 25 with nearly all published in the last 5 years in the Journal of Patient Safety where Denham was editor.

In his article in Forbes, Michael Millenson quotes an accomplished patient safety advocate who left her first meeting with Denham convinced she had met with one of the most brilliant individuals of her life (4). Those who know Denham suspect that he would agree (6). The tendency of very smart and successful individuals to boss others is well known because in their own minds they are smarter and better, even when the evidence says otherwise. Some can even blur the boundaries between what they have done, what they are doing and what they hope to do-convincing themselves that it is in the patients' best interests. Like Watergate did to the Nixon White House, Denham has tainted many in the quality movement. Hence the title of this editorial-"Qualitygate". A lot of money is involved in patient safety and there are undoubtedly some willing to sacrifice principles for personal gain. This will probably not be the last scandal in the quality movement. As we have noted previously, there are probably too many guidelines based on expert opinion and some are wrong (7). Physicians need to exercise their own best judgment in deciding which guidelines need to be implemented.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs. CareFusion to pay the government $40.1 million to resolve allegations that include more than $11 million in kickbacks to one doctor". Available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/14-civ-021.html (accessed 2/21/14).
2. Wikipedia. Charles Denham. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Denham (accessed 2/21/14). 
3. Newswise. Dr. Charles Denham named editor of Journal of Patient Safety. Available at: http://www.newswise.com/articles/dr-charles-denham-named-editor-of-journal-of-patient-safety (accessed 2/21/14).
4. Allen M. Hidden financial ties rattle top health quality group. Propublica. Available at: http://www.propublica.org/article/hidden-financial-ties-rattle-top-health-quality-group (accessed 2/21/14).
5. Carlson J. Groups cut ties to Denham. Modern Healthcare. Available at: http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140201/MAGAZINE/302019962 (accessed 2/21/14). 
6. Millenson M. The money, the MD and a $12 million patient safety scandal. Forbes. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelmillenson/2014/02/14/the-money-the-md-and-a-12-million-patient-safety-scandal/ (accessed 2/21/14).
7. Robbins RA. What's wrong with expert opinion? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):71-3. [CrossRef]

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Qualitygate: the quality movement's first scandal. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(2):132-4. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc022-14 PDF

What's Wrong with Expert Opinion?

In this month's Pulmonary Journal Club Dr. Mathew reviews an article by Feuerstein et al. (1) from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Harvard Medical School published in the Mayo Clinic Proceedings (2). The authors reviewed  the evidence basis for 153 interventional guidelines including 2 from the American College of Chest Physicians and the American Thoracic Society. Of the 3425 recommendations reviewed, 11% were supported by level A evidence, 42% by level B, and 48% by level C. These numbers are very close to the results published by Lee and Vielemeyer (3) for the Infectious Disease Society of America guidelines where only 14% of the guidelines were based on level A evidence and 55% by level C.

So what's wrong with the majority of guidelines based on expert opinion? After all, these are experts in the field and it can be argued that most of these opinions are probably right and that physicians want guidance from the experts. The problem is that they are opinion and sometimes wrong. When they are wrong the potential exists for causing large and devastating harm to patients. This has become an increasingly frequent. As examples:

1. Tight control of glucose in the intensive care unit which according to the largest and best done multi-center trial, causes a 14% increase in ICU mortality (4).
2. Xigris (activated protein C) for adults with septic shock which caused an increase in bleeding and a small but insignificant increase in mortality leading to withdrawal of the drug (5).
3. Perioperative beta blockers which Cole and Francis calculated caused an excess mortality of 800,000 deaths in Europe over the past 5 years (6).
4. Fluid boluses for in African children with severe infection which caused a 49% increase in mortality (7).

Guideline interventions leading to a decrease in mortality are rare and there are no carefully-done, randomized trials of guidelines that have shown a 14% decrease in mortality in the ICU, saved 800,000 lives or improved mortality by 49% in severe infection. So the question arises why were these guidelines put in place, and in some cases, why do they persist? In an editorial which was to be published on January 21 in the European Heart Journal, Cole and Francis raised the possibility that the responsibility for misconduct lies not just with misguided researchers but also the institutions and the institutional leaders that provide uncritical support to research factories. Further, they discussed the role of journal editors and, even, journal readers. However, the two editorials were withdrawn about an hour after the first was published.

It appears that some guidelines have become a cesspool of conflicts of interest (COI). As pointed out in the article Dr. Mathew reviewed, 62% of the guidelines failed to comment on COIs; when disclosed, 91% of guidelines reported COIs. In a egregious example of COI influencing guidelines, the research done by Don Poldermans on perioperative beta blockers has been discredited and he has been dismissed from his university (6). Poldermans also chaired the guideline writing committee for the European Society of Cardiology on perioperative beta blockers. The previously mentioned editorials by Cole and Francis discussing Poldermans' research and its implications were retracted by the European Heart Journal. Why the journal chose to retract the editorials is unclear but one wonders if threats of loss of advertising or lawsuits from pharmaceutical company lawyers may have had something to do with it.

The story of Xigris is a further example of COIs gone amuck (8,9). Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of Xigris, provided a $1.8 million grant to fund a task force on “Values, Ethics and Rationing in Critical Care” reportedly to further the concept that it was unethical to withhold Xigris from septic patients. Eli Lilly provided over 90% of the funding for The Surviving Sepsis Campaign, launched in October 2002 to create guidelines for the treatment of sepsis.  Many of the international experts who formulated the recommendations of this group had significant outside financial relationships with Eli Lilly. As subsequent prospective trials began to raise important concerns regarding the safety and efficacy of Xigris, these concerns were repeatedly and conspicuously absent from published recommendations of the Surviving Sepsis campaign. In 2004, Eli Lilly started a program of offering unrestricted grants to institutions for implementing Surviving Sepsis Campaign patient management bundles.

The leaders in healthcare from the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) to the local leaders often have substantial COIs combined with a weak backgrounds in medicine and research. For example, the evidence basis for IHI's 100,000 Lives Campaign was weak (10). However, the non-peer reviewed press releases allowed IHI to receive a landslide of “brand recognition” which undoubtedly led to substantial new revenues and philanthropic dollars (10). Locally, many CEOs and managers are operating under incentive systems that tie bonuses to guideline compliance. One chairman of medicine, asked me, "Why is my bonus tied to how many pneumococcal vaccines are administered?". Others may not be so willing to question the hand that feeds them.

It is unclear why professional societies and medical boards have been so silent about guidelines with a weak evidence base. Both were created to protect the public's health. Practice of medicine and nursing has been restricted to those with appropriate education and licensure who accept the responsibility for their actions. The guideline process can allow the unscrupulous to side step these regulations and responsibility, sometimes for their own financial gain. If the medical societies and medical boards are unwilling to intervene, perhaps a federal agency or regulator not vulnerable to such concerns might be better suited to regulate the implementation of guidelines.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

References

1. Feuerstein JD, Akbari M, Gifford AE, Hurley CM, Leffler DA, Sheth SG, Cheifetz AS. Systematic analysis underlying the quality of the scientific evidence and conflicts of interest in interventional medicine subspecialty guidelines. Mayo Clin Proc. 2014;89(1):16-24. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
2. Mathew M. January 2014 pulmonary journal club: interventional guidelines. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):70. [CrossRef]
3. Lee DH, Vielemeyer O. Analysis of overall level of evidence behind infectious diseases society of America practice guidelines. Arch Intern Med. 2011;171:18-22. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
4. NICE-SUGAR Study Investigators, Finfer S, Chittock DR, et al. Intensive versus conventional glucose control in critically ill patients. N Engl J Med. 2009;360(13):1283-97. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
5. Ranieri VM, Thompson BT, Barie PS, et al. Drotrecogin alfa (activated) in adults with septic shock. N Engl J Med 2012; 366:2055-64. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
6. Maitland K, Kiguli S, Opoka RO, et al. Mortality after fluid bolus in African children with severe infection. N Engl J Med. 2011;364(26):2483-95. [CrossRef] [PubMed] 
7. Eichacker PQ, Natanson C, Danner RL. Surviving Sepsis – Practice guidelines, marketing campaigns and Eli Lilly. N Engl J Med 2006;355:1640-2. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
8. Raschke RA. July 2012 critical care journal club. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;5:54-7.
9. Robbins RA. The unfulfilled promise of the quality movement. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):50-63. [CrossRef]

*The views expressed in this editorial are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. What's wrong with expert opinion? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):71-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc008-14 PDF

The Tremendous Threes! Annual Report from the Editor

With the end of 2013, the Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care (SWJPCC) completed its third year of operation. Our first manuscript was posted on November 11, 2010. We posted 8 manuscripts our first year, 68 in 2011, 113 in 2012 and 164 in 2013 (Table 1).

Table 1. Yearly submissions, total postings and postings by category.

Accompanying our increase in manuscripts, our readership has steadily grown to over 12,000/month unique IP addresses and over 16,000/month page views (the number of files that are requested from a site, also known as “hits”) (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Growth of unique IP addresses and page views by month November 2010 to December 2013.

We had some big changes in 2013. Some of which are listed below:

• The Mayo Clinic Minnesota Critical Care partnered with the Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado Thoracic Societies in SWJPCC.
• Continuing medical education was offered for the Cases of the Month in Pulmonary, Critical Care and Imaging
• There was a marked increase in the number of imaging postings, particularly the “Medical Image of the Week”.
• We have begun a monthly series entitled “Ultrasound for Critical Care Physicians” taking advantage of an on-line’s journal capability to display movies.
• A Tucson Pulmonary Journal Club was added.
• We added digital object identifiers (doi) for each posting.
• We began using CrossRef to link references to their doi and to PubMed.
• CLOCKSS began preserving our content.

Many need to be thanked. First, thanks to our authors. You took a chance on a new journal and we appreciate the opportunity to publish your work. Second, thanks to our reviewers.  SWJPCC, like all journals, relies upon expert reviewers in order to publish the highest quality manuscripts. We thank the reviewers for their time and effort in the prompt submission of their reviews. A list of reviewers for 2013 is below:

• Owen Austrheim
• David Baratz
• Jay Blum
• Michel Boivin
• Rohit Budhiraja
• Janet Campion
• John Galgiani
• Michael Garrett
• Richard Gerkin
• Michael Gotway
• Richard Helmers
• Steven Klotz
• James Knepler
• KennethKnox
• Timothy Kuberski
• Calvin Kunin
• Manoj Mathew
• Vijaychandran Nair
• Sairam Pathsarathy
• Vinay Prasad
• Neal Rinee
• Clement Singarajah
• Linda Snyder
• Allen Thomas
• Lewis Wesselius

Our gratitude goes to the Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado Thoracic Societies and the Mayo Clinic Rochester for their support. Thanks to our associate editors who have put in much more work than we had the right to ask. A special note of thanks to those who continue to do regular features in SWJPCC-Bob Raschke and Manoj Mathew for the critical care and pulmonary journal clubs; Mike Gotway, Lew Wesselius and Bob Raschke for the cases of the month; Rohit Budhiraja for the Sleep Question of the Month; and Ken Knox for the Medical Image of the Week; and Peter Wagner for his wine column, Slurping Around with PDW. SWJPCC acknowledges the Phoenix Pulmonary and Critical Care Research and Education Foundation which has provided the monetary support for SWJPCC and Squarespace our web host. Last, and most importantly, thanks to our readers. Please visit as often as you can and feel free to provide us with your input.

What’s ahead for 2014? We hope to improve the content, especially the scientific content, for 2014, but we will continue to emphasize clinical medicine and education. CME will continue to be offered for the previous 12 Pulmonary, Critical Care, and Imaging Cases of the Month for a total of 36 CME offerings at any one time. We would welcome suggestions for any improvements.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

Reference as: Robbins RA. The tremendous threes! annual report from the editor. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014:8(1):1-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc001-14 PDF

Obamacare and Computers-Who Is to Blame?

Count me among the unsympathetic to the recent Center for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) problems with the rollout of Obamacare, aka the Affordable Care Act. Yesterday, Marilyn Tavenner, the Administrator of CMS, apologized for the troubled rollout of the federal health insurance web site and promised to fix the problems that have prevented many consumers from signing up for coverage (1). Today, Tavenner’s boss, Kathleen Sebelius, Health and Human Services Secretary acknowledged “frustrating” problems that would be fixed “as soon as possible”. She offered an apology for the site’s troubled launch, while also attributing the glitches to private-sector contractors (2). The later is particularly telling.

We have repeatedly heard how the “magic” of the computer can solve problems in health care (3). To this end, CMS created a Medicare Electronic Health Care (EHR) Incentive Program and touted that eligible professionals could receive up to $44,000 over 5 years for full implementation (4). However, CMS estimated the average cost of implementing an EHR over 5 years was $48,000 or a loss of $4,000 assuming the best reimbursement. It is not clear how close these dollar amounts match the actual numbers but a number of private practice physicians have complained that the cost was much more and the reimbursement much less (Robbins RA, unpublished observations). What was most disturbing is the implication that physicians are to blame when EHR implementation is slow or fails to achieve the promised improved care at lower costs (3).

The recent Obamacare rollout problems can be blamed on a variety of issues from too many contractors involved, inadequate testing, poor leadership, etc., but the main fault has been the perception that health information technology (IT) is easy. However, the available evidence suggests that health IT is not “magic”.  In most industries, IT has taken years, often decades to exert its effects (5).  Personally I believe health IT can have a huge beneficial effect on healthcare delivery-but it might take a decade or two. 

A meaningful partnership between clinicians, administrators and payers achieving and rewarding high-value care is needed. To do this physicians need considerable input, and perhaps more importantly, control of any EHR. Second, physicians need to be rewarded for good care which is centered on improved patient outcomes and not endless checklists that do little more than consume time. Failure to do so will result in inefficient and more costly care and not in the improvements Obamacare promised. To paraphrase Cassius from Julius Caesar, the fault is not in our contractors, but in ourselves. It is distressing that political ambition and arrogance may jeopardize the healthcare of millions of Americans.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor, SWJPCC

References

1. Somashekhar S. Administration official Marilyn Tavenner apologizes for HealthCare.gov problems. Washington Post. October 29, 2013. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/administration-official-marilyn-tavenner-apologizes-for-healthcaregov-problems/2013/10/29/4d2a07ea-40c6-11e3-9c8b-e8deeb3c755b_story.html (accessed 10/30/13).
2. Branigin W, Somashekhar S. Kathleen Sebelius acknowledges “frustrating” problems with health-care web site. Washington Post. October 30, 2013. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kathleen-sebelius-acknowledges-frustrating-problems-with-health-care-web-site/2013/10/30/8cf36c98-415e-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html (accessed 10/30/13).
3. Robbins RA. Getting the best care at the lowest price. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;5:145-8.
4. http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/ehrincentiveprograms/ (accessed 10/30/13).
5. Jha A. As the debate over Obamacare implementation rages, a success on the IT front. The Health Care Blog. July 12, 2013. Available at: http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2013/07/12/as-the-debate-over-obamacare-implementation-rages-a-success-on-the-it-front/ (accessed 10/30/13).

*The views expressed in this editorial are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Arizona, New Mexico or Colorado Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Obamacare and computers-who is to blame? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;7(4):269-70. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc145-13 PDF 

HIPAA-Protecting Patient Confidentiality or Covering Something Else?

A case of a physician fired from the Veterans Administration (VA) for violation of the Health Care Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) illustrates a problem with both the law and the VA. Anil Parikh, a VA physician at the Jesse Brown VA in Chicago, was dismissed on a charge of making unauthorized disclosures of confidential patient information on October 19, 2007.  On January 3, 2011 the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) reversed Dr. Parikh’s removal.

Dr. Parikh's initially made disclosures to the VA Office of Inspector General and to Senator Barack Obama and Congressman Luis Gutierrez, in whose district the Jesse Brown VA lies.  Dr. Parikh alleged that there were systematic problems within the Jesse Brown VA that resulted in untimely and inadequate patient care. The confidential patient information Parikh disclosed included examples of the misdiagnoses and misdirection of patients within the hospital. Specifically, Dr. Parikh alleged that a physician failed to diagnose a patient’s rectal abscess and sent him home rather than refer him for proper surgical treatment. Two patients who should have been accepted in the emergency room were improperly directed to the urgent care area. One of these patients who should have been admitted to the intensive care unit was improperly placed on the general medical floor, resulting in the eventual deterioration of his condition to the point where he required intubation. Parikh later testified that he made these disclosures out of concern for patient health and safety.

The IG referred the matter to Mr. James Jones, director of the Jesse Brown VA for investigation. Mr. Jones assigned Dr. Jeffrey Ryan, Associate Chief of Staff, to investigate the allegations. Dr. Ryan concluded that there was no evidence of mismanagement or misdiagnosis and the IG closed their case. Dr. Parikh then disclosed the information to Denise Mercherson, his own attorney; Dr. Fred Zar, the director of the internal medicine residency program at Loyola, the American College of Graduate and Medical Education (ACGME) and other members of Congress serving on Congressional VA oversight committees. After these disclosures, Parikh was fired by Mr. Jones.

After exhausting his appeals to be reinstated with the VA Office of Special Counsel, Parikh filed an individual right of action (IRA) with the MSPB contending that his disclosures were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), and that the VA removed him based on those protected disclosures. The administrative judge hearing the case found that Parikh failed to establish MSPB jurisdiction over his appeal because “he failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that any of his disclosures were protected under the WPA”.  Parikh then filed a petition for review by the full board, and the MSPB reversed the initial decision.  The issue for MSPB was whether Parikh's disclosures were protected under the WPA. Although the administrative judge initially hearing the case found that Parikh failed to establish that he reasonably believed these disclosures were evidence of a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, the full MSPB disagreed. They found that the nature of the harm that could result from patient care and management issues that Parikh disclosed was "severe” that could result in patient death.

The VA argued that Parikh's disclosures were prohibited under HIPPA. According to Lisa Yee and Timothy Morgan, lawyers for the Chicago VA General Counsel, Parikh's disclosures were not covered by the WPA because the WPA and the Privacy Act of 1974 excludes disclosures prohibited by law. The VA also argued that Dr. Parikh's disclosures were prohibited by HIPAA. The MSPB had little trouble rejecting both these arguments, finding that one of the exceptions is a disclosure to a Congressional committee. The VA lastly argued that Dr. Parikh's disclosures were prohibited by VA policy since the VA had not approved disclosure of the information. However, the MSPB found that the VA's policy in question was not a "substantive" rule, but merely a reference to the HIPPA and the Privacy Act. The MSPB found that the disclosures were a factor to his removal and ordered him reinstated with back pay.

Physicians considering a career with the VA should carefully examine this case. The MSPB concluded that the VA retaliated against Dr. Parikh, not for disclosing confidential patient information, but whistleblowing. After over 3 years, Dr. Parikh has his job back but his work situation is probably not “friendly”. And what has become of the VA administrators and their lawyers who violated WPA by retaliating against Dr. Parikh-to my knowledge, nothing.

The adversarial relationship between the VA administrators and physicians appears to be a one-way street. A physician can have their career destroyed by the VA, but if the accusations are unjustified, there are no consequences to the accusers. On the other hand, physicians that voice concerns for patient care and safety can have their professional reputation ruined by the VA. Particularly concerning is the misuse of HIPAA by VA attorneys as a weapon against physicians.

Dr. Parikh’s case would not appear to be an isolated event. A quick review of the news reveals a VA nurse in Albuquerque was charged with sedition for criticism of the Bush administration’s handling of hurricane Katrina and Iraq (2).  In Phoenix a VA physician was fired after forwarding an e-mail from a Senator John McCain staffer suggesting physicians go to a McCain political rally and lobby for a new VA research building (3). The Phoenix VA chief of hematology/oncology resigned after his name was placed in the National Practioner Databank; an action he felt was unjustified (4). Most recently the Phoenix VA public relations director was demoted after giving unfavorable testimony about VA administrators (5). If the VA is having trouble recruiting as their recent TV advertising suggests, they might consider a different approach. A good start would be the use of HIPAA to protect patient confidentiality rather than cover something else.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor

References

1. US Merit System Protection Board. 2011 MSPB 1. Docket No. CH-1221-08-0352-B-2. Available at: http://www.mspb.gov/. Accessed 9/10/13. 
2. Dees DE. VA nurse in New Mexico accused of sedition. Mother Jones. 2006. Available at: http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2006/02/va-nurse-new-mexico-accused-sedition. Accessed 9/10/13. 
3. Franklin RE. VA doc fired for political email. Arizona Star. 2011. Available at: http://azstarnet.com/news/local/va-doc-fired-for-political-email/article_3e353bbf-b04a-52ff-8a9c-6cb49e78a47a.html. Accessed  9/10/13.
4. Robbins RA. Profiles in medical courage: Thomas Kummet and the courage to fight burearcracy. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;6(1):29-35.
5. Wagner D. VA official in Arizona demoted after her testimony. Arizona Republic. Available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20130314va-official-arizona-pedene-demoted-after-testimony.html  accessed 9/10/13.

Reference as: Robbins RA. HIPAA-protecting patient confidentiality or covering something else? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;7(4):236-8. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc128-13 PDF

Are Medical Guidelines Better Than Flipping a Coin?

A recent article by Prasad et al. (1) in the Mayo Clinic Proceedings reviewed all original articles published over 10 years (2001-2010) in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). Articles were classified on the basis of whether they addressed a medical practice, whether they tested a new or existing therapy, and whether results were positive or negative. Most striking was that of the 363 articles examining standards of care, 146 (40.2%) reversed that practice, whereas 138 (38.0%) reaffirmed it. The remaining percentage remained inconclusive.

As pointed out in an accompanying editorial, the NEJM is widely read, has high visibility and has a large influence on the mass media and medical practitioners (2). However, the effect of articles published in the NEJM, Lancet and JAMA, the top 3 general medical journals in terms of impact factor, are markedly inflated (3,4). Presumably, a randomized trial published in these journals must be true because these are the “best” medical journals. 

Prasad’s conclusions that the NEJM reversed accept medical practice about half the time would be consistent with the Cochrane Review of Clinical Trials.  El Dib et al. (5) concluded in 2004 that there is insufficient evidence to endorse the examined interventions 47.8% of the time. A repeat evaluation in 2011 showed that the percentage of insufficient evidence remained about the same (6).

Now before anyone gets too upset, I happen to agree that NEJM, Lancet and JAMA are probably the best and most influential medical journals. Authors send their best work to these journals because they are widely read. The editors choose articles based on their importance and whether the work is new, innovative, or contradicts accepted medical practice. All of this makes these journals the most influential.

Not surprisingly, authors of guidelines give more credibility to these higher impact journals. In other words, a randomized trial done in the NEJM is more likely to influence a guideline writing committee that a trial from the Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care. Looking at Bob Raschke’s recent journal club reviewing 6 landmark randomized controlled trials that were eventually reversed, 5 were from the NEJM or JAMA (7). Several of the outcomes from these studies were the basis for guidelines.

Guideline writing committees really cannot do better than the medical literature.  However, if half the established standards of care are wrong as Prasad suggests, half the guidelines based on these standards of care are also wrong. Should we require higher levels of evidence before practice guidelines are recommended-perhaps at least two, or in cases of marginal effects, even more trials. To me the overwhelming answer has to be yes.

Lee and Vielemeyer (8) found that only 14% of the Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA) guidelines are based on level I evidence (data from >1 properly randomized controlled trial). Much of this 14% and the 86% that are below level I evidence will eventually be proven wrong. I doubt that other medical societies are performing much better. Serving on a guideline writing committee is a compliment paid by professional colleagues. However, as Lee and Vielemeyer point out, the guidelines tend to be more opinion than science. This is especially true when the data supporting standards of care is weak, nonexistent or conflicting. Experts often rationalize that an answer is needed, even when the correct response might be “I don’t know”.

All this points out that reading and interpreting medical literature is difficult. It takes knowledge, experience and a healthy dose of skepticism.  Experts relying on the best evidence frequently get it wrong. Improvement lies in the intellectual honesty of the guidelines committees and research. Well designed clinical trials are usually expensive and time-consuming, not what health care administrators want to hear in a time of restricted budgets. However, can we afford not to invest in getting it right?

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

References

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*The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or policies of the Arizona, New Mexico, or Colorado Thoracic Societies, the Mayo Clinic, or most guideline writing committees.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Are medical guidelines better than flipping a coin? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;7(3):181-3. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc124-13 PDF